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Abstract
Watermarking is the process of embedding information in a carrier in or-
der to protect the ownership of text, music, video and images, while steganog-
raphy is the art of hiding information.
Normally watermarks are embedded in images but remain visible in the
majority of commercial image databases, such as Getty (gettyimages.ie) or
iStock Photo (istockphoto.com). Watermarked images display ownership in-
formation in the form of copyright notices super-imposed on the image it-
self. However this leaves traditional watermarking techniques vulnerable to
tampering. Thus the advantage of using steganographic techniques for wa-
termarking is that the watermark is resistant to detection and consequently
to tampering.
Robustness is a characteristic of critical importance, in order that a wa-
termark is to survive image manipulation and enhancement processes, as well
as intentional attacks, to ensure piracy is prevented.
A review of digital image-based steganography and watermarking tech-
niques is carried out in this document. This investigation reveals that most
watermarking algorithms demonstrate partial resistance to attacks.
The aim of this work is to produce a novel hybrid digital watermarking
technique, based on the exploitation of both the RGB and the YCbCr colour
spaces, using spatial domain techniques. A text watermark is embedded in
the YCbCr colour space, while an image watermark is embedded in the RGB
colour space. Results demonstrate that the proposed hybrid technique can
withstand levels of geometric attacks and processing attacks up to a point
where the commercial value of the images tested would be lost. Results also
demonstrate technical and performance improvements over existing methods,
in terms of security and algorithm eﬃciency, while taking inspiration from
steganography, to avoid drawing attention to the fact that an image contains
hidden information.
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Abbreviations
GIF Graphics Interchange Format
JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group
PNG Portable Network Graphics
BMP Bitmap
HVS Human Visual System
LSB Least Signiﬁcant Bit
DCT Discrete Cosin Transform
FT Fourier Transform
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
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QT Quantization Table
PSNR Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
NMSE Normalized Mean Squared Error
SSIM Structural Similarity measuring the similarity between two im-
ages.
LPM Log Polar Mapping
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JND Just Noticeable Diﬀerence.
CRT Cathode Ray Tube, describing the technology inside an analog
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SECAM Sequentiel Couleur Avec Memoire (Sequential Colour with Mem-
ory)
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
PoVs Pair of Values
GNU-GPL GNU General Public Licence is a widely used free software li-
cense, originally written by Richard Stallman for the GNU project
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The unprecedented increase in piracy and digital criminality over the
past 10 years has stimulated interest in the ﬁeld of watermarking to enhance
protection against violations of copyrighted digital material, such as digital
images. According to a recent study carried out by TERA Consultants for
the International Chamber of Commerce and made public in March 2010, the
European creative industries lost around 9.9 billion euros and over 186,000
jobs in 2008 because of piracy, mainly digital piracy [77].
Watermarking, steganography and encryption are closely linked and some-
times combined when hiding information. The work presented here focuses
on watermarking and steganography in digital images and to limit the scope
of the work, does not discuss any other type of media.
Watermarking aims at identifying the creator, owner or distributor of
a digital document, whereas steganography aims at hiding digital informa-
tion into a digital document. Although their objectives are slightly diﬀer-
ent, watermarking and steganography are closely related, as they use similar
methods to embed the required information into digital images.
Graphics Interchange Format (GIF), Joint Photographic Experts Group
(JPEG) and Portable Network Graphics (PNG) represent the most popular
image formats on the Internet [85]. The PNG ﬁle format was created as
the open-source successor to the GIF, which is a proprietary format. Most
of the watermarking and steganography techniques are developed to exploit
these three diﬀerent image structures and they also often use Bitmap (BMP)
images as intermediary results or for evaluation purpose. Such image ﬁles
use the .bmp ﬁle extension.
Over the last 15 years, many watermarking methods have been developed
and tested with the aim of providing reliable ways of proving image owner-
ship. Surveys detailing the most popular watermarking techniques can be
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found in the literature [60, 43]. This document does not attempt to give a
comprehensive review of all the watermarking and steganographic techniques
developed over the past 15 years, as there is an impressive amount of research
in this area. Rather, this document discusses the most signiﬁcant steps and
techniques developed in the context of watermark invisibility and robustness
in hiding information in digital images, in order to propose a novel water-
marking technique approach. This technique will be based on advances in
steganography, and may be of interest as an addition to the current state of
the art techniques in this area of research.
1.2 Organisation
Chapter 2 introduces watermarking and steganography related to digital
images. Chapter 3 presents the potential attacks that a digital image can
be subjected to and the various benchmarking tools, which have been devel-
oped to measure the eﬃcacy of watermarking and steganography algorithms
in resisting these attacks. Chapter 4 discusses the main methods used in dig-
ital image watermarking and digital image steganography and compares the
major embedding techniques (watermarking and steganography), developed
in this area, with their beneﬁts and drawbacks. Most of the studies revolve
around the exploitation of grey scale images. However, their application to
colour images might not be completely adequate since they do not take into
consideration the full implication of the Human Visual System (HVS) and
in particular its sensitivity to colour brightness and perception. In order to
explore this further, Chapter 5 presents the diﬀerent colour spaces, their re-
lation to the HVS and some research done in this area. This results in the
description of an algorithm in Chapter 6, designed to achieve robustness and
the methodology used to address the shortcomings of other grey scale algo-
rithms. Chapter 7 presents and analyses the experiment test results. Finally,
Chapter 8 draws the conclusions and discusses potential improvements and
future work.
2
2 DIGITAL IMAGEWATERMARKINGAND
STEGANOGRAPHY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deﬁnes Watermarking and Steganography and outlines the
fundamental diﬀerences and objectives that each tries to achieve. Although
not considered in this project, Fingerprinting is brieﬂy discussed in the con-
clusion.
Three techniques are inter-linked, i.e. steganography, watermarking and
cryptography. The ﬁrst two are quite diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate especially for
those working in areas outside this domain. Figure 1 and Table 1 may help
in clarifying the diﬀerences.
Figure 1: The diﬀerent embodiment disciplines of information hiding.
(Adapted from Cheddad [9], the blue path indicates the goal of this study)
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Criterion/Method Watermarking Steganography Encryption
Carrier mostly im-
age/audio/video
ﬁles
any digital
media
usually text
based, with
some extensions
to image ﬁles
Secret data watermark payload plain text
Key optional optional necessary
Input ﬁles at least two,
unless in
self-embedding
at least two
unless in
self-embedding
one
Detection usually
informative i.e.,
original cover or
watermark is
needed for
recovery
blind blind
Authentication usually achieved
by cross
correlation
full retrieval of
data
full retrieval of
data
Objective copyright
preserving
secret
communication
data protection
Result watermarked-ﬁle stego-ﬁle cipher-text
Concern robustness detectability/
capacity
robustness
Type of attacks image
processing
steganalysis cryptanalysis
Visibility sometimes never always
Fails when it is re-
moved/replaced
it is detected de-ciphered
Relation to
cover
usually becomes
an attribute of
the cover image.
The cover is
more important
than the
message.
not necessarily
related to the
cover. The
message is more
important than
the cover.
N/A
Flexibility cover choice is
restricted
free to choose
any suitable
cover
N/A
History ancient, except
its digital
version
very ancient,
except its
digital version
modern era
Table 1: Comparison of steganography, watermarking and encryption
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2.2 Watermarking
The word watermarking is derived from the much older notion of placing
a visible watermark on paper [86]. Watermarking was originally designed
as an artifact to identify a speciﬁc paper maker or to discourage printed
currency counterfeiting. One of the earliest watermarks was found in an
Italian paper made in Bologna in 1282, and this technique quickly spread
throughout Europe [6]. Paper watermarking is still in use today, in more
elaborate forms such as currency notes. It is also used to signify that a paper
is of high-quality.
In the digital era, a digital image watermarking process consists of em-
bedding information into a host image (also called a cover image) so as to
prove the authenticity of the image. More recently, watermarks in images
are invisible to the viewer, mainly so that they don't get in the way of an
image rather than to avoid detection. The more recent design processes aim
at fulﬁlling characteristics such as invisibility, robustness, security, capacity,
and complexity:
 Invisibility: the watermark cannot be detected with the human eye.
 Robustness: the embedded information is robust if it can be extracted
reliably, even if the image has been modiﬁed (but not destroyed com-
pletely). Robustness thus signiﬁes the resilience of the watermark in
an image to incidental changes or image operations. This implies that
it will be possible to extract the watermark after the image has been
subjected to transformations and that the watermark will be identiﬁ-
able.
 Security: a watermarking algorithm is considered secure if the embed-
ded information cannot be destroyed, detected or forged, given that the
attacker has full knowledge of the watermarking technique, has access
to at least one piece of marked data material, but does not know the
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secret key. Only the intended audience which possesses the proper key
or which has knowledge of the embedding procedure can successfully
extract the valid watermark.
 Capacity: describes the volume of information (usually in bits) that can
be embedded. It addresses also the possibility of embedding multiple
watermarks.
 Complexity: describes the eﬀort and time needed to embed and retrieve
a watermark. This parameter is essential for real time commercial
applications and is usually measured in terms of computing power used
over time.
There are two major steps in the digital watermarking process, as can be
seen in Figure 2:
 Watermark embedding: the watermark is inserted into a host image
(an encryption technique may be used).
 Watermark extraction: the watermark is separated from the host image
(a decryption technique may be used).
6
Figure 2: A general digital image watermarking system
2.3 Steganography
Steganography is the art and science of invisible communication [9]. This
is accomplished through hiding information in other information, thus hiding
the existence of the communicated information. The advantage of steganog-
raphy, over cryptography alone, is that messages do not attract attention
to themselves. Therefore, whereas cryptography protects the contents of a
message, steganography can be said to protect both messages and communi-
cating parties.
The word steganography is derived from the Greek words stegos mean-
ing cover and graﬁa meaning writing, deﬁning it as covered writing
[9]. In image based steganography, the information is hidden exclusively in
images. The idea and practice of hiding information has a long history. The
Greek historian Herodotus wrote of Histaeus, who needed to communicate
with his son-in-law in Greece. He shaved the head of one of his most trusted
slaves and tattooed the message onto the slave's scalp. When the slave's hair
grew back the slave was dispatched with the hidden message.
In the Second World War the Microdot technique was developed by the
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Germans. Information, especially photographs, was reduced in size until it
was the size of a typed full stop. Extremely diﬃcult to detect, a normal
cover message was sent over an insecure channel with one of the full stop
on the paper containing hidden information. Today steganography is mostly
used on computers with digital data being the carriers and networks being
the high speed delivery channels.
Although steganography is an ancient subject, its modern formulation is
often given in terms of the prisoners' problem proposed by Simmons [74],
where two inmates wish to communicate in secret to hatch an escape plan.
All of their communication passes through a warden who will throw them
in solitary conﬁnement should any covert communication be suspected. The
warden, who is free to examine all communication exchanged between the in-
mates, can either be passive or active. A passive warden simply examines the
communication to try and determine if it potentially contains secret informa-
tion. If it is suspected that a communication contains hidden information,
a passive warden takes note of the detected covert communication, reports
this to some outside party and lets the message through without blocking it.
An active warden, on the other hand, will try to alter the communication
with the suspected hidden information deliberately, in order to remove the
information.
A good steganographic algorithm should comply with a few basic require-
ments [9], including:
 Invisibility: the most important requirement is that a steganographic
technique has to be invisible. The goal of steganography is to avoid
drawing attention to the transmission of a hidden message. If suspicion
is raised, then this goal is defeated.
 Payload capacity: unlike watermarking, which needs to embed only a
small amount of copyright information, steganography aims at hidden
communication and therefore requires suﬃcient embedding capacity
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 Robustness against statistical attacks: statistical steganalysis is the
practice of detecting hidden information through applying statistical
tests on image data. Many steganographic algorithms leave a signa-
ture when embedding information that can be easily detected through
statistical analysis. (More on steganalysis in Chapter 4)
 Robustness against image manipulation: during the communication
process, the image may undergo changes by an active warden in an
attempt to remove hidden information. Manipulation of the image can
be eﬀected before it reaches its destination. Depending on the manner
in which the message is embedded, these manipulations may destroy
the hidden message. It is preferable for steganographic algorithms to be
robust against either malicious or unintentional changes to the image.
For example JPEG compression can alter the data and accidentally
destroy the hidden message.
 Independent of ﬁle format: with many diﬀerent image ﬁle formats used
on the Internet, it might seem suspicious that only one type of ﬁle for-
mat is continuously communicated between two parties. A powerful
steganographic algorithm thus possesses the ability to embed informa-
tion in any type of ﬁle. This also solves the problem of not always
being able to ﬁnd a suitable image at the right moment, in the right
format to use as a cover image.
 Unsuspicious ﬁles: this requirement includes all characteristics of a
steganographic algorithm that may result in images that are not used
normally and may cause suspicion. Abnormal ﬁle size, for example, is
one property of an image that can result in further investigation of the
image by a warden.
The fundamental requirement of steganographic systems is that the stego-
image must be as close as possible to the original image so that it does
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not raise any suspicion. Embedding capacity and invisibility are the two
major requirements which are widely studied in the various steganography
techniques [50, 89, 64, 10, 14]. Resistance to attacks is not emphasized as
much.
Over the past decade, three signiﬁcant surveys on steganographic tech-
niques have been published. Johnson et al. [38] published their extensive
survey in 1999, in Information Hiding. Since then steganographic tech-
niques have evolved a lot. Bailey et al .[5] evaluated the diﬀerent spatial
steganographic techniques, based on the Least Signiﬁcant Bit (LSB) tech-
nique, applied to GIF images (published in 2006). A very comprehensive
and up-to-date survey (published in 2009) on image steganography can be
found in Cheddad et al. [9].
2.4 Conclusion
Watermarking is closely related to steganography. However, watermark-
ing is mainly concerned with the protection of intellectual property, thus
watermarking algorithms have diﬀerent requirements than steganography.
In watermarking all of the instances of an image are marked in the same
way. The kind of information hidden in images when using watermarking is
usually a signature to signify origin or ownership for the purpose of copy-
right protection. With ﬁngerprinting, diﬀerent, unique marks are embedded
in distinct copies of the carrier object that are supplied to diﬀerent cus-
tomers. This enables the intellectual property owner to identify customers
who break their licensing agreement, by supplying the property to third par-
ties. In watermarking, the fact that information is hidden inside images may
be public knowledge, sometimes it may even be visible, while in steganog-
raphy the imperceptibility of the information is crucial. A successful attack
on a steganographic system consists of an adversary observing that there is
information hidden inside a ﬁle, while a successful attack on a watermarking
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system would not be to detect the mark, but to remove it. Fingerprinting,
although brieﬂy mentioned here as a way of identifying ownership, is outside
of the scope of this research.
Traditional steganography conceals information. Watermarks extend in-
formation and become an attribute of the cover image. Digital watermarks
may include such information as copyright, ownership, or license. In steganog-
raphy, the object of communication is the hidden message. In digital water-
marking, the object of communication is the cover. It is also important
to note that watermarking and steganography techniques can be used on a
variety of digital media. This research is focused solely on digital images.
Before exploring the various techniques used, it is necessary to understand
the type of attacks to which a digital image can be subjected. This is the
purpose of the next section.
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3 DIGITAL IMAGE ATTACKS
3.1 Introduction
In order to identify the weaknesses of the various watermarking tech-
niques, one needs to understand the diﬀerent types of attacks on digital
images. Attacks can be unintentional or intentional. Intentional attacks are
usually more diﬃcult to survive than the unintentional attacks [73].
Attacks may further be categorised as malicious, if their goal is to re-
move the watermark or make it unrecoverable. Such attacks can be blind
(not knowing the algorithm used for watermarking) or informed (exploiting
knowledge of algorithm used for watermarking).
Non-malicious attacks on the other hand can be deﬁned as transforma-
tions during normal use of image manipulation, such as compression, ge-
ometric and temporal manipulations, digital to analogue conversion, noise
reduction or removal of part of the image (cropping).
Cox et al. [22] have discussed extensively which level of robustness is
appropriate to the type of watermarking application. They mention some of
the attacks and their countermeasures.
Voloshynovskiy et al. [81] and Shih [73] (p. 51-61), have classiﬁed attacks
into 4 categories: (1) interference and removal attacks (image processing at-
tacks), (2) geometrical attacks, (3) cryptographic attacks and (4) protocol
attacks. This section brieﬂy describes each attack category and the bench-
marking tools that are available to compare algorithm robustness against
these attacks.
3.2 Image processing attacks
 Filtering is the process of applying a ﬁlter to the frequency domain.
Sharpening ﬁlter attack, blurring ﬁlter attack and Gaussian ﬁlter attack
are examples of ﬁlter attacks.
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 Re-modulation is the process of removing the noise from an image. It
is an eﬀective attack with little distortion.
 JPEG Coding distortion is a popular compression algorithm.
 JPEG 2000 Compression uses wavelet based technology, resulting in a
high compression ratio without the blocky visual eﬀect of JPEG com-
pression.
3.3 Geometric transformation
Geometrical attacks, while not directly aimed at removing the water-
mark, instead try to either weaken it or disable its detection. This can be
done using image manipulation programs such as Macromedia Fireworks or
Adobe Photoshop. They potentially introduce local jittering or local geo-
metrical bending in addition to a global geometrical transformation. As a
consequence, most watermark detectors will lose synchronization with the
embedded information and therefore these attacks are also referred to as
synchronization attacks. They include:
 Scaling: the process of down sampling by reducing the length and width
of an image, followed by up sampling through interpolation.
 Rotation: a clockwise or anti-clockwise angle rotation is applied to an
image.
 Clipping: a portion of an image is kept, the rest is removed.
 Linear transformation: achieved by applying a linear transformation
matrix.
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 Bending: this technique was originally proposed by Petitcolas [59]. An
image is interpolated after nonlinear geometric distortions are applied.
A small amount of compression and noise are also added.
 Warping: it is a pixel by pixel remapping such that any shapes por-
trayed in the image have been signiﬁcantly distorted.
 Perspective projection: parallel lines converge, the object size is re-
duced. As a consequence the object shape is not preserved.
 Collage: a combination of diﬀerent image parts.
3.4 Cryptographic attack
The aim of Cryptographic attack is to ﬁnd the encrypted key used for
embedding the watermark, if any. An exhaustive key search may be used as a
strategy against any encrypted data by an attacker. It involves systematically
checking all possible keys until the correct key is found. This technique,
better known as brute-force attack, is very process-intensive. But once found,
the watermark can be overwritten. It is a deliberate attack, also called a
malicious attack.
3.5 Protocol attack
The aim of Protocol attack is to cause ambiguity regarding true ownership
of the image, by removing the original watermark and reinserting another
one in its place. It is part of the intentional attacks (malicious attacks).
Approaches employed most frequently are ﬁlter models. Removing noise
from the marked image using median or high pass ﬁltering, are methods
considered very likely to succeed [73].
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3.6 Benchmarking tools
To prevent unauthorised use of digital content using digital watermarking,
the robustness of the watermarking should be evaluated in detail. Benchmark
tools have been developed for this purpose. These tools can show which
attack will break the embedded digital watermarks.
3.6.1 Stirmark
Stirmark is a generic tool [61], developed in 1997, to evaluate the robust-
ness of watermarking algorithms. It determines an overall score by applying
various types of attacks available (9 in total).
The ﬁrst version of Stirmark introduced random bilinear geometric dis-
tortions to de-synchronise watermarking algorithms. Then several versions
followed improving the original attack but also introducing a longer list of
tests. In January 1999 Stirmark 3.1 was released as a benchmark tool. It
allows for fair evaluation procedures for watermarking systems.
Stirmark can be considered also as a generic steganalysis tool perform-
ing removal of the hidden message. It simulates a resampling process, by
introducing the same kind of errors into an image as printing it on a high
quality printer and then scanning it again with a high quality scanner. If
information embedded by an algorithm into an image does not survive the
Stirmark process, then the steganographic technique used should be consid-
ered unacceptably easy to break.
3.6.2 Optimark
Optimark is a benchmarking tool for still image watermarking algorithms
that was developed in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Information Analysis
Laboratory at the Department of Informatics, Aristotle University of Thes-
saloniki, Greece [75].
The attacks that are currently included in Optimark are the following:
Cropping, Line and Column Removal, General Linear Transformation, Scal-
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ing, Shearing, Horizontal Flip, Rotation, Auto cropping and Auto scale,
Sharpening, Gaussian Filtering, Median, JPEG.
3.6.3 Certimark
Certimark is a benchmarking platform for certiﬁcation of watermarking
algorithms at European level, resulting from the collaboration of 14 academic
and industrial partners [7]. It intends to perform the certiﬁcation process on
watermarking algorithms, thus becoming the benchmark of reference. This
project is still at an early stage of development.
3.6.4 Checkmark
Checkmark provides a benchmarking tool to evaluate the performance of
watermarking techniques [81]. It provides additional attacks unavailable in
Stirmark.
3.7 Conclusion
Stirmark is by far the most used in watermarking studies for providing
a large array of attacks, using automated tests. Kamiya et al. [39] however
criticise the current benchmarking tools for not reﬂecting the reality of po-
tential combined attacks. They propose a new benchmark tool that supports
evaluations using many images. As it is still in its infancy, no recent studies
using Kamiya's alternative have been found.
In the next chapter, the review the main methods used in steganography
and watermarking to hide information in digital images is presented.
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4 DATA HIDING AND STEGANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
The major distinction made in the study of watermarking for digital images is
between visible watermarks and invisible ones. Visible watermarks are used
to mark a digital image in a clearly detectable way, in order to give a general
idea of what the image looks like, while preventing any commercial use of that
particular image. In this case, the purpose is to prevent any unauthorised
use of an image by adding an obvious identiﬁcation key, which removes the
image's commercial value. On the other hand, invisible watermarks are used
for author identiﬁcation in order to determine the origin of an image. They
can also be used in the detection of unauthorised image copying, either to
prove ownership or to identify a customer. The invisible scheme does not
intend to forbid any access to an image but rather to tell if a speciﬁed image
has been used without its owner's formal consent or if the image has been
altered in any way. This approach is certainly the one that has received the
most attention in the past ten years.
Following this line of investigation, it is possible to choose many ways for
hiding information.
Watermarking can be accomplished by simply feeding the following code
into a DOS emulated Windows command prompt [9]:
C:\> Copy original_image.jpg /b + watermark.txt /b combined_image.jpg
This code appends any text found in the ﬁle watermark.txt into the
JPEG image ﬁle original_image.jpg and produces the combined image
combined_image.jpg. The idea behind this is to exploit the recognition
of EOF (End of ﬁle). In other words, the watermark is appended after the
EOF tag. Opening combined_image.jpg in any image editing application
will just display the picture ignoring anything coming after the EOF tag.
However, when opened in Notepad for example, the text watermark reveals
itself after displaying some data bytes. The embedded message does not
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impair the image quality. Neither image histograms nor visual perception
can detect any diﬀerence between the two images due to the secret message
being hidden after the EOF tag. Whilst this method is simple, a range of
online steganography software uses it (Camouﬂage, JpegX). Unfortunately,
this simple technique would not resist any editing to the combined image nor
any attacks by steganalysis experts.
Another simple implementation is to append hidden data to the image's
Extended File Information, which is a standard used by digital camera man-
ufacturers to store meta data information in the image header ﬁle, e.g. the
make and model of a camera. Unfortunately, it is as unreliable as the previous
method because it is very easy to overwrite such information.
Very early research focused on LSB insertion in the spatial domain (pixel
level) of images for its simplicity and its potentially large capacity. Later
scientiﬁc research considered the frequency domain and the quantisation of
coeﬃcients.
Research conducted for the purpose of this work would indicate that
watermarking and steganography techniques can be classiﬁed into three main
categories:
 Spatial Domain methods
 Frequency Domain methods
 Adaptive methods
Adaptive methods are treated as a special case here, because they can either
be applied to the spatial domain or to the frequency domain.
The following sections examine each domain methodology and analyse
their impact on achieving the optimum watermarking requirements, deﬁned
in the previous chapter.
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4.2 Spatial Domain Methods
Spatial domain methods concern the modiﬁcation of a pixel value directly
on the spatial domain of an image [54]. All studies referred to in this section
are applied to either JPG or BMP images.
One of the simpler approaches to hiding data within an image ﬁle is LSB
insertion. Using this method, the binary representation of the hidden data
is computed and LSB of each byte within the cover image is overwritten. As
an example, three adjacent pixels (nine bytes) are shown with the following
encoding:
10010101 00001101 11001001
10010110 00001111 11001010
10011111 00010000 11001011
Now suppose the following 9 bits of data 101101101 are hidden. If these
9 bits are overlaid on the LSB of the 9 bytes above, the following is obtained
(where the bits in bold have been changed):
10010101 00001100 11001001
10010111 00001110 11001011
10011111 00010000 11001011
Note that the 9 bits have been hidden but at a cost of only changing 4,
or approximately 50%, of the LSBs.
This section outlines two main approaches to embedding in the spatial
domain applied to watermarking studies.
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4.2.1 Least Signiﬁcant Bit Substitution
It is an algorithm based on pre-deﬁned LSB substitution of pixels which
composes an image as described by Shih [72], Celik [13] and Cvejic [23]. This
is illustrated in the above example. The watermark (secret message) itself is
converted into a bit stream before each bit is inserted in the predeﬁned bit
positions of pixels, part of the image as seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Pixels bit substitution
The image pixel value is decomposed into an array of 8 bit values. If the
watermark bit value is 1, the corresponding image pixel LSB value is set to
1, else it is set to 0. The values 34, 30 and 12 in Figure 3 represent pixel
values in the range 0 to 255.
There is a trade-oﬀ between preserving the image quality versus informa-
tion hiding (watermark or secret message) payload, although it is generally
accepted that modifying the LSB of each pixel does not visually alter image
quality. A reasonable capacity is a third the size of the host image original
size [73] (p. 34). This algorithm, presented by Shih [72] and Celik [13], is
easy to break, by ﬂipping the least signiﬁcant bit of every pixel of the image,
or by embedding a new watermark on top of the current one. On the other
hand, it is easy to implement and it requires less processing power. To al-
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leviate this concern, other algorithms [23] have been introduced whereby a
private key is used to deﬁne where the bit value should be embedded (LSB,
LSB2 or LSB3). Varying the bit position used, makes it a lot more diﬃcult
to ﬁnd which bit is used to embed the watermark bit.
4.2.2 Additive Method
This method basically adds an amount of the watermark value into each
pixel value (rather than using bits of the pixel) composing the image, as seen
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Additive watermarking in the spatial domain
The watermark is ﬁrst converted to a bit stream. For a watermark bit
value of 1, the image pixel value is increased with a predeﬁned coeﬃcient
(100 in this example), so that for a pixel value of 34, if the watermark bit
is 1, the ﬁnal image pixel value becomes 134. If the watermark bit is 0, the
original image pixel value remains unchanged. After the additive process, if
a value becomes greater than 255, it is thresholded at a value of 255. The
higher the coeﬃcient, the more robust the watermarking technique, but the
more perceptible it becomes [47]. Further this method also usually requires
the original image in order to extract the watermark.
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To improve imperceptibility, Lin [47] uses a block of pixels instead of in-
dividual pixels. This process shows an increased probability in recovering the
hidden data, after the combined image is exposed to various attacks. How-
ever, the original image is needed to extract the watermark, since one does
not know which blocks were used to embed the watermark. In this scenario,
the original image needs to be stored securely, and so be easily accessible to
perform the operation. Also, there is a signiﬁcant loss of embedding capacity,
due to the fact that a block of pixels is used rather than individual pixels.
This might be a problem as regards steganography but it is not a major
hurdle as regards watermarking, for the simple reason that the amount of
information to be hidden is typically small. For example, a watermark can
be a social security number, which uniquely identiﬁes a person.
4.2.3 Histogram
Histogram equalisation is used in image processing to adjust contrasts
[33]. The aim of this technique is to better distribute intensity values on
the histogram. This allows for image areas of lower local contrast to gain
a higher contrast. Histogram equalization accomplishes this by eﬀectively
spreading out the most frequent intensity values.
Histogram-based data-hiding is another commonly used watermarking
scheme. In its simplest form, pre-deﬁned histogram values are used to embed
the watermark. Chrysochos et al. [12] chose a blind algorithm with an
asymmetric key to embed the watermark into histogram values. They show
that after embedding, the histogram shape is mainly preserved. They also
demonstrate their algorithm to be robust against geometrical attacks such
as rotation, ﬂipping, translation, aspect ratio changes and resizing, warping,
shifting, drawing and scattered tiles, as well as their combinations. They did
not test their algorithm against compression nor against ﬁltering attacks. In
addition, the data hiding capacity is very much restricted to 127 bits (for
22
grey-scale images) and 384 bits for colour images.
Such a scheme has the advantage of recovering the original cover image
from the combined image. In addition, a modiﬁed histogram does not aﬀect
the visual perception of the image. The main drawback of this technique
is that the embedding strategy can be detected more easily, just by com-
paring the histogram shape of the original image versus the watermarked
image. Chrysochos and Bayley [12, 6] suggest that the main advantage of
histogram based data hiding is its robustness to rotations and other geometric
transformations. On the other hand, the main diﬃculty associated with this
technique is that there is a non-linear relationship between its representation
and the pixel representation.
4.2.4 Remarks
It is well accepted in the literature that the LSBs of a digital image
can be changed without degrading the perceived quality. LSB methods can
generally be characterised as requiring low computation power, while poten-
tially hiding large amounts of data. There is however a trade oﬀ between
the embedding capacity and the visual impact, due to image distortion, in
particular with additive methods. Image processing operations can destroy
part of the watermark due to the fact that the embedded watermark might
be localised to small portions of an image, making this technique not very
robust. A solution to this problem is to distribute the watermark around the
entire image - or signiﬁcant parts of - the image, which, if removed or altered,
would degrade its commercial value. For example, HVS characteristics can
be applied to hide the watermark information, although success is based on
favorable image characteristics. While it is not an issue in steganography
(one can choose whatever image is most suited for better results), this can
become an obstacle in watermarking.
One potential problem with any of the LSB methods is that they can be
discovered visually by an adversary who is looking for unusual patterns, or
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by using steganalysis tools.
LSB manipulation is a fast and relatively inexpensive way of hiding in-
formation but it tends to be vulnerable to spatial changes resulting from
image processing or lossy compression. Such compression is a key advan-
tage that JPEG images have over other formats. High quality images can
be stored in relatively small ﬁles using JPEG compression method. LSB's
natural shortcoming regarding weaknesses against image manipulations such
as JPEG compression, has led researchers to look into the frequency domain.
The next section discusses these techniques.
4.3 Frequency Domain
Signal transformation is deﬁned and its role in extracting valuable infor-
mation from a digital signal presented.
4.3.1 Signal Transformation
To obtain further information from a signal, that is not readily available in
the raw signal, mathematical transformations are applied. Fourier transforms
are the most popular transformations [76]. Most of the signals in practice
are time-domain signals in their raw format, so that whatever the signal is
measuring, is a function of time (time-amplitude representation of the signal
on the x and y axis). In many cases, the most distinguished information is
hidden in the frequency content of the signal.
The frequency spectrum of a signal shows what frequencies exist in the
signal. Rapid changes in the signal are known as high frequencies, whereas
drawn out changes are known as low frequencies. The frequency is measured
in cycles per second, or Hertz. Looking at Figure 5, the ﬁrst representation
is a sine wave at 3 Hz, the second one at 10 Hz.
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Figure 5: Frequency comparison
The Fourier Transform (FT) is a way of showing how much of each fre-
quency is in a signal. The frequency axis starts from zero, and goes up to
inﬁnity and each frequency has an amplitude value. Frequency information
is valuable because, very often, the information that cannot be readily seen
in the time-domain can be seen in the frequency domain. A typical example
of this is ECG (Electrocardiography), where the typical shape of a healthy
ECG is well known and any deviation is very often symptomatic of an un-
derlying pathology. Although FT is one of the most popular transforms
used (especially in electrical engineering), it is not the only one. Hilbert
transform, Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT), Wigner distributions, the
Radon Transform, the Wavelet Transform (WT), are others. Each technique
has its own area of application. FT and WT are of particular interest to im-
age processing because they are reversible transforms, i.e., they allow going
back and forward between raw and processed signals.
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The following section describes the three frequency transforms used in
data hiding techniques in the frequency domain of digital images and it dis-
cusses some research done with each technique.
The watermark is introduced into the frequency coeﬃcients of the trans-
formed image as described by Huang [36], either by Discrete Fourier Trans-
form (DFT), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) or Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form (DWT). Additive and multiplicative watermarking methods are used
to embed the information into the frequency coeﬃcients. The substitution
method is similar to the one described in the spatial domain. Except that
frequency coeﬃcients are used rather than pixels, as seen in Figure 6 and
Table 2.
Figure 6: Example of embedding a 3 bit watermark in the frequency domain
of an image using DCT
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Watermark
(bits)
Original
image
coeﬀ.
Integer
part
Binary
format
Watermarked
binary
Watermarked
coeﬀ.
0 -42.7 42 00101010 00101010 -42.7
1 30.6 30 00011110 00011111 31.6
1 -4.9 4 00000100 00000101 -5.9
Table 2: LSB substitution into the coeﬃcients of the transformed image in
Figure 4.
Additive watermarking is used extensively in the literature due to its
simplicity.
4.3.2 Discrete Cosine Transform
The discrete cosine transform (DCT) helps separate the image into parts
(or spectral sub-bands) of diﬀering importance. The DCT transforms a signal
or image from the spatial domain to the frequency domain. With an input
image, A, the coeﬃcients for the output image B, are:
B(k1,k2) =
∑N1−1
i=1
∑N2−1
j=0 4 . A(i,j) .cos
[
pi.k1
2.N1
.(2.i+ 1)
]
. cos
[
pi.k2
2.N2
.(2.j + 1)
]
where the input image is N2 pixels wide by N1 pixels high, A(i, j) is the
intensity of the pixel in row i and column j, B(k1, k2) is the DCT coeﬃcient
in row k1 and column k2 of the DCT matrix.
All DCT multiplications are on real numbers [11, 1, 44, 91]. DCT is widely
used with image compression such as JPEG lossy compression, because it has
a strong energy compaction property [69]: most of the signal information
tends to be concentrated in a few low-frequency components of the DCT.
Frequency components with minimal values are discarded, leaving only the
signiﬁcant contributors of an image. DCT based algorithms are more robust
to JPEG lossy compression which is also based on the DCT. Unfortunately,
these DCT based schemes are not robust to basic transformations.
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Zhu et al. [90] have proposed an improved DCT scheme based on per-
ceptually shaping watermark block-wise, using localized gain factor for each
block. The distortion created by the watermark addition is measured using
Watson's DCT based visual model for each block [24], rather than the entire
image. An adjustment strategy is then implemented in order to seek the best
trade oﬀ between robustness and imperceptibility. Their experimental results
seem to concur with those of Voloshynovskiy [81]. However they diﬀer in the
choice of block size upon which to base their computations. Li and Wang
[45] proposed the modiﬁcation of the Quantisation Table (QT) part of the
JPEG and used the middle frequency coeﬃcients to hide the message. The
aim of quantisation is to retain the valuable information while eliminating
the not so important information.
Diaz and Grana Romay [70] have proposed a multi-objective genetic al-
gorithm which searches the best localisation of the DCT of an image to place
the mark-image-DCT-coeﬃcients for minimal visual distortion and optimal
robustness. They measured the results of this algorithm based on the Pareto-
Front, which represents the trade-oﬀ between image ﬁdelity and robustness.
Predicting attack type and strength is however not a simple matter. It is
therefore very unlikely that this algorithm would ﬁt all conditions.
4.3.3 Discrete Fourier Transform
The Fourier Transform is an important image processing tool which is
used to decompose an image. The output of the transformation represents the
image in the Fourier or frequency domain, while the input image is the spatial
domain equivalent. In the Fourier domain image, each point represents a
particular frequency contained in the spatial domain image. The Fourier
Transform is used in a wide range of applications, such as image analysis,
image ﬁltering, image reconstruction and image compression.
The DFT is the sampled Fourier Transform and therefore does not contain
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all frequencies forming an image, but only a set of samples which is large
enough to fully describe the spatial domain image. The number of frequencies
corresponds to the number of pixels in the spatial domain image, i.e. the
images in the spatial and Fourier domain are of the same size.
For a square image of size NÖN, the two-dimensional DFT is given by:
F(k, l) =
∑N−1
i=1
∑N−1
j=0 f (i, j)e
−i2pi(kiN+ ljN )
where f(i, j) is the image in the spatial domain and the exponential term is
the basis function corresponding to each point F(k, l) in the Fourier space.
The equation can be interpreted as: the value of each point F(k, l) is obtained
by multiplying the spatial image with the corresponding base function and
summing the result.
The basis functions are sine and cosine waves with increasing frequencies,
i.e. F(0,0) represents the DC-component of the image which corresponds
to the average brightness and F(N − 1,N − 1) represents the highest fre-
quency. Low frequencies are responsible for the general grey-level appear-
ance of an image over smooth areas, while high frequencies are responsible
for detail (edges and noise) [33]. The DFT, based on fast Fourier trans-
form methodology, uses phase modulation instead of magnitude components
to hide messages, since phase modulation has less visual eﬀect. The out-
put of the transformation represents the image in the Frequency Domain.
This methodology has been used by Chi-Man [16], Kim [41], Kutamura [42],
Qiang [68] and Zheng [93], which demonstrate that DFT is preferable to DCT
when it comes to dealing with geometric manipulations such as cropping and
translation.
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4.3.4 Discrete Wavelet Transform
DWT is any wavelet transform for which the wavelets are discretely
sampled [84]. Unlike the Fourier transform (sinusoidal functions), wavelet
transforms are based on small waves of varying frequency and of limited
duration. As with other wavelet transforms, a key advantage it has over
DFT and DCT is its temporal resolution: it captures both frequency and
location information (location in time). Consequently, features that might
go undetected at one resolution might be easier to spot at another [76].
The WT was developed as an alternative to the Short Time Fourrier
Transform. Various high pass and low pass ﬁlters are applied to the signal,
to ﬁlter out either high frequency or low frequency portions of the signal. To
better understand the reasons behind the popularity of using this transform
to hide information in images, the DWT needs to be explored in more depth.
A concrete example will be used to clarify the point.
Let's suppose a signal has frequencies up to 1000 Hz. The ﬁrst stage is to
split up the signal into two parts by passing the signal through a highpass and
a lowpass ﬁlter (using admissibility condition) which results in two diﬀerent
versions of the same signal:
 The portion of the signal corresponding to 0-500 Hz (low pass portion),
and
 The portion of the signal corresponding to 500-1000 Hz (high pass
portion).
Either the low pass portion or the high pass portion is used, and the same
operation is repeated. This is called decomposition. Assuming that the low
pass portion is used, the resultant is three sets of data, each corresponding
to the same signal at frequencies 0-250 Hz, 250-500 Hz, 500-1000 Hz. Taking
the low pass portion again and passing it through low and high pass ﬁlters
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and this results in four sets of signals corresponding to 0-125 Hz, 125-250 Hz,
250-500 Hz, and 500-1000 Hz. The same operation is repeated until a pre-
deﬁned condition is met. The result is a number of signals, which actually
represent the same signal, but all corresponding to diﬀerent frequency bands.
Which signal corresponds to which frequency band is known, and if all are
put together and plotted on a 3-D graph, time will be in one axis, frequency
in the second and amplitude in the third axis.
The main reason why researchers have switched to WT from STFT is
that STFT gives a ﬁxed resolution at all times, whereas WT gives a variable
resolution as follows: higher frequencies are better resolved in time, and
lower frequencies are better resolved in frequency. This means that, a certain
high frequency component can be located better in time (with less relative
error) than a low frequency component. On the contrary, a low frequency
component can be located better in frequency compared to high frequency
component.
The decomposition of the signal into diﬀerent frequency bands is simply
obtained by successive high pass and low pass ﬁltering of the time domain
signal [76]. The original signal x[n] is ﬁrst passed through a half band high
pass ﬁlter g[n] and a low pass ﬁlter h[n]. After the ﬁltering, half of the samples
can be eliminated according to the Nyquist's rule, since the signal now has a
highest frequency of pi / 2 radians instead of pi. The signal can therefore be
sub-sampled by 2, simply by discarding every other sample. This constitutes
one level of decomposition and can mathematically be expressed as follows:
yhigh[k] =
∑
nx[n].g[2k−n]
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ylow[k] =
∑
nx[n].h[2k−n]
where yhigh[k] and ylow[k] are the outputs of the high pass and low pass
ﬁlters, respectively, after sub sampling by 2.
This decomposition halves the time resolution since only half the num-
ber of samples now characterises the entire signal. However, this operation
doubles the frequency resolution, since the frequency band of the signal now
spans only half the previous frequency band, eﬀectively reducing the uncer-
tainty in the frequency by half. The above procedure, which is also known
as the subband coding, can be repeated for further decomposition. At every
level, the ﬁltering and sub sampling will result in half the number of samples
(and hence half the time resolution) and half the frequency band spanned
(hence double the frequency resolution). Figure 8 illustrates this procedure,
where x[n] is the original signal to be decomposed, and h[n] and g[n] are low
pass and high pass ﬁlters, respectively. The bandwidth of the signal at every
level is marked on the ﬁgure as "f".
As illustrated in Figure 7, assume that the original signal has 512 sample
points, spanning a frequency band of zero to pi rad/s. At the ﬁrst decom-
position level, the signal is passed through the highpass and lowpass ﬁlters,
followed by sub-sampling by 2. The output of the highpass ﬁlter has 256
points (hence half the time resolution), but it only spans the frequencies
pi/2 to pi rad/s (hence double the frequency resolution). These 256 samples
constitute the ﬁrst level of DWT coeﬃcients as illustrated in Figure 8. The
output of the lowpass ﬁlter also has 256 samples, but it spans the other half
of the frequency band, frequencies from 0 to pi/2 rad/s.
32
Figure 7: Subband Coding Algorithm
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Figure 8: DWT Frequency decomposition
This signal is then passed through the same lowpass and highpass ﬁlters
for further decomposition. The output of the second low-pass ﬁlter followed
by subsampling has 128 samples spanning a frequency band of 0 to pi/4 rad/s,
and the output of the second highpass ﬁlter followed by subsampling has 128
samples spanning a frequency band of pi/4 to pi/2 rad/s. The second highpass
ﬁltered signal constitutes the second level of DWT coeﬃcients. This signal
has half the time resolution, but twice the frequency resolution of the ﬁrst
level signal. In other words, time resolution has decreased by a factor of
4, and frequency resolution has increased by a factor of 4 compared to the
original signal.
The DWT of the original signal is then obtained by concatenating all
coeﬃcients starting from the last level of decomposition. The DWT will then
have the same number of coeﬃcients as the original signal. The frequencies
that are most prominent in the original signal will appear as high amplitudes
in that region of the DWT signal that includes those particular frequencies.
The diﬀerence between this transform and the Fourier transform is that
the time localisation of these frequencies will not be lost. However, the
time localisation will have a resolution that depends on which level they
appear. If the main information of the signal lies in the high frequencies,
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the time localisation of these frequencies will be more precise, since they are
characterised by a greater number of samples. If the main information lies
only at very low frequencies, the time localisation will not be very precise,
since few samples are used to express signal at these frequencies.
This procedure in eﬀect oﬀers a good time resolution at high frequencies,
and good frequency resolution at low frequencies. The frequency bands that
are not very prominent in the original signal will have very low amplitudes,
and that part of the DWT signal can be discarded without any major loss
of information. This is how DWT provides a very eﬀective data reduction
scheme (JPEG 2000 compression).
The DWT provides a powerful insight into an image's spatial and fre-
quency attributes. Hence, the DWT has gained a lot of popularity (most of
the recent research on digital grey scaled image watermarking is based on
DWT [26, 49, 53]), for the fast transformation approach that translates an
image from spatial domain to frequency domain while still providing robust-
ness. An example of such a decomposition on Lena image can be seen in
Figure 9.
In a general way, the watermark is inserted in the transform coeﬃcients.
The insertion process may be separated in 3 phases: computation of the DWT
coeﬃcients (using various ﬁlters such as Haar, Daubechies [34]), addition
of the watermark to those coeﬃcients (for example modifying those that
are above a given threshold in the sub-bands other than the low pass sub-
band) and compute the inverse DWT to reconstruct the watermarked image.
Ghannam et al. [31] proposed a variant, where embedding is performed in two
bands representing low and high frequency components in order to achieve
both imperceptibility and robustness. Zao, Chen and Liu have proposed a
combination of frequency domain transform [92], in order to beneﬁt from
advantages of both DCT and DWT.
DWT watermarking schemes are robust to JPEG and JPEG2000 com-
pression. Another advantage is that they facilitate determining the salient
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Figure 9: Two level DWT using a grey-scaled lena Image and the
Daubechies ﬁlter [34]
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areas of an image (i.e. the perceptually most signiﬁcant information) where
the strength of the embedded watermark is adjusted.
4.3.5 Remarks
A frequency domain approach appears more attractive in general, in terms
of robustness to compression and ﬁltering than the Spatial Domain, because
it decorrelates the spatial relationship between each pixel. A watermark
embedded into the low frequencies increases the risk of becoming visible. On
the other hand, because compression and ﬁltering aﬀects the high frequencies,
targeting the high frequencies for watermark embedding increases the risk of
watermark destruction. Embedding a watermark in the medium frequencies
is a good compromise in particular when distributed across the entire image.
It is a more robust technique since the embedded watermark is spread out
[20].
The hidden information is generally diﬃcult to detect, but on the other
hand the watermarking payload must be small (compared to spatial domain
watermarking) because of a higher risk of image distortion, hence a higher
potential detection risk.
The location of the large absolute values (signiﬁcant coeﬃcients) would
make watermarking even more robust. Noise addition, for example, increases
the number of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients [19]. Unfortunately, images in the vast
majority of cases do not contain so many signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, so water-
marking capacity is limited. One answer is to artiﬁcially increase the amount
of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, through the use of (block based) chaotic map [92]
to break the local spatial similarity of an image [73] (p122). However, the
capacity remains limited and the risk of embedding visibility is increased.
Embedding in the DWT domain has shown promising results and cer-
tainly outperforms DCT embedding in terms of compression survival [9].
However, recent advances in the understanding of the HVS has opened new
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avenues of research, which are the subject of Chapter 5.
4.4 Adaptive watermarking
All aformentioned watermarking methods hide the watermark in the spa-
tial or the frequency domain, by addition, multiplication or replacement. To
do so, a ﬁxed raster (pixel grid or ﬁxed size block image division for example)
is used for embedding and extracting the watermark. Further research in the
HVS suggests that exploiting certain image characteristics (corners, edges,
luminance) might protect the embedded data from deliberate attacks. The
hypothesis is as follow: if the watermark is hidden in regions of an image
less likely to be modiﬁed because of their intrinsic value, the watermark's
survival probability would be increased. Methodologies which use visually
signiﬁcant regions in an image to hide the watermark [3, 57, 67] are classiﬁed
in this section.
Cox et al. [20] have indicated that watermarks should be embedded into
regions with large magnitudes in the frequency coeﬃcients, since geometric
processing aﬀects regions with low coeﬃcients.
Chen et al. [14] proposed a LSB-based solution to embed the hidden
message into pixels located in the image edges. They combined the fuzzy
edge detector with the Canny edge detector to increase the embedding pay-
load. They also claim this technique to be resistant to statistical analysis
(steganalysis), due to the pixel selection approach they use. Although the
image quality is preserved after embedding, this algorithm limits the amount
of data to hide relative to the amount of edges available in the image. Images
with smooth colour and intensity transitions would probably not be suited
to this algorithm.
Region-based embedding is a technique that embeds a watermark over the
region of an image, to spread out the message, where the embedding capacity
is restricted to the chosen block size. Miller [56] has used the technique of
informed coding and embedding with a similar problem of low embedding
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capacity.
Mathias Schlauweg et al. [71] proposed an algorithm where the water-
marking position is determined by the image content, using textels (texture
elements), particularly the grey-level blob, which has the property of being
scale invariant, therefore resistant to geometric attacks. By using a pre-
deﬁned signiﬁcant blob and measuring the distance from the other chosen
blobs, they demonstrated that this technique provides a better resistance to
a wider range of geometric transformation attacks and the embedded wa-
termark remained perceptually invisible due to the high masking eﬀect. A
disadvantage of this technique, is that the distance computed between the
reference point and the other blobs must be available in order to extract the
hidden information. This technique is also computer-resource-intensive, due
to the complexity of this algorithm.
Zhiwei et al. [89] presented a method based on wavelet and modulus
functions. They used image block division and wavelet decomposition to
compute each block modulus, to decide where to embed the secret informa-
tion and how much should be embedded so that it cannot be perceived by the
human eye. Adapting the embedding capacity to the image texture proved
to increase embedding capacity while maintaining good imperceptibility. It
currently remains unclear how well this algorithm performs against geometric
attacks.
Lou et al. [50] proposed an adaptive steganography scheme, capable of
providing for a large embedding capacity, while preserving the visual quality
of an image. They use the variation among the immediate neighbouring pixel
values to predict the embedding capacity of each pixel. However, they did
not measure the robustness of their algorithm against attacks.
A skin tone detection steganography algorithm is proposed by Cheddad
et al. [10], which demonstrates robustness to attacks, while keeping the stego
data invisible, by embedding in skin regions of an image. This is perfectly
suited to steganography where the cover image can be speciﬁcally chosen with
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skin attributes in it. Unfortunately, this technique is not generic enough to
suit watermarking, where one has no choice when it comes to choosing the
cover image.
Genetic Algorithms are an important optimisation technique [35], in the
area of evolutionary computation. Khan et al. [40] have suggested the idea of
exploiting the HVS, combined with genetic algorithms, to structure a water-
mark based on the cover image and the intended attack, to optimise imper-
ceptibility and robustness. Although results show signiﬁcant robustness over
a few speciﬁc attacks, they are not predictable by nature, therefore, it remains
to be seen if genetic algorithms are a practical solution to counteract multi-
ple attacks, while trying to preserve invisibility. One way to resist attacks is
to invert attack distortions at the decoding end. Gilani et al. [32] concen-
trated on increasing the robustness of a watermarking system by estimating
a watermarked image distortion, using distortion estimation functions based
on Genetic Programming. Results show superior performance compared to
the previously proposed technique by Piva et al [63]. However, the technique
uses known attacks to generate the estimation functions, i.e. the original
image is tested against the attacked image to generate the best estimation
function. There are a lot of undeﬁned variables that can interfere with the
process, such as what attack or combination of attacks should the host image
be protected against, and for each attack, what is the degree of the attack.
To produce the results, Gilani et al. had to pre-deﬁne the attacks, which
unfortunately does not reﬂect the reality.
More recently, Autrusseau et al. [3] have demonstrated the usefulness
of combining the advances in the understanding of the HVS with a Fourier
space watermarking technique, in providing good robustness properties when
subjected to many kinds of distortions. Mohanty et al. [57] suggest extracting
the most perceptually important region of an image to embed the watermark,
using a combination of HVS metrics such as intensity, contrast, location and
edges.
40
Cong [18] uses Canny edge detection to isolate pixels of signiﬁcance in
the representation of an image (feature points matching) so that even after
attacks, the watermark can be retrieved by a blind process and identiﬁed.
In the domain of exploiting the HVS for steganography, Chen et al. [14]
have demonstrated an interesting hybrid edge detector algorithm (a combi-
nation of fuzzy edge detector with Canny edge detector) to improve payload
capacity and invisibility, in the spatial domain, using an LSB embedding
technique.
4.4.1 Remarks
Many variations of the spatial and frequency methods, or a combina-
tion of both, have been explored by the scientiﬁc community in attempt
to improve watermark robustness. Table 3 summarises the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
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Method Properties
Spatial Domain Simple, low processing required.
Large payload without altering the host
image visual aspect.
Less robust against lossy compression and
ﬁlters.
Less robust against rotation, cropping and
translation.
Less robust against noise.
Many work mainly on the BMP format.
Tendency to be more sensitive to
steganalysis.
Frequency Domain Computational complexity.
Less prone to attacks at the expense of
capacity.
Breach of second order statistics.
Breach of coeﬃcients distribution.
Not as robust against geometric attacks.
Not as robust against noise addition.
Robust to compression.
Variable sensitivity to steganalysis
Adaptive Embedding Computational complexity.
Small embedding space at the beneﬁt of
robustness.
Variable resistance to rotation, translation,
cropping and noise addition.
Resistance to lossy compression, when using
the DWT.
Performs better than DCT algorithms in
keeping the carrier distortion to a minimum.
Ability to embed secret data into diﬀerent
orientation act as an additional secret key.
More resistant to steganalysis.
Table 3: Methods comparison
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4.5 Steganalysis
As presented in Chapter 2, security is an important characteristic of any
watermarking scheme. It may seem obvious, but it is important to note that
an invisible watermark attracts less attention than a visible one. Similarly, if
one does not suspect the presence of a watermark, one is less likely to try to
remove it, or to interfere with it. It is in the context of watermark security
that steganalysis comes into play.
The goal of steganalysis is to identify suspected information in digital
streams and to determine whether or not they have hidden messages encoded
in them, and, if possible, to recover the hidden information. The various
problems handled by steganalysis are:
 Identiﬁcation of an embedding algorithm.
 Detection of the presence of hidden message in a cover signal.
 Estimation of embedded message length.
 Prediction of location of hidden message bits.
 Estimation of secret key used in the embedding algorithm.
 Estimation of parameter of embedding algorithm.
 Extraction of hidden message.
 Or simply the destruction of any hidden message, without trying to
recover the message.
In the context of steganography, steganalysis is also used to determine whether
a message is secure, in which case the steganography algorithm is successful.
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As seen in the previous sections, there are many diﬀerent possible ways
to embed data. In order to ﬁnd the presence of a hidden message, one solu-
tion would be to attempt to reverse all possible embedding techniques to see
whether or not a hidden message is present. But this would be a monumen-
tal task to undertake. Fortunately, just as statistics came to the rescue of
code-breakers, so too does it help steganoanalysts. The basis of any feasible
steganoanalytical investigation is in ﬁnding a set of easily measurable charac-
teristics which change when a message is embedded into images. For digital
image steganalysis, these characterstics are generally based on the statistics
of the potential cover object. Such a characteristic is the high correlation
among neighbouring pixels of an image. Image pixel data have statistical
properties, which are disturbed by the process of embedding. Other image
characteristics which can be disturbed after data hiding are colour composi-
tion and luminance. These are exploited in steganalysis of images. Various
techniques for steganalysis are described in the next sections.
4.5.1 Visual observation
One method for detecting the existence of hidden messages is to look for
obvious and repetitive patterns which may point to positive identiﬁcation.
An approach used to identify such patterns is to compare the original image
with the watermarked image, using the naked eye.
Most steganographic and watermarking algorithms studied for the pur-
pose of this research, embed the message bits either sequentially or in some
pseudo-random fashion. In most algorithms, the message bits are chosen
independently of the image content. In the case of using simple visual in-
spection, if the image contains homogeneous areas, or areas where the pixel
colour is saturated at either 0 or 255, one can look for suspicious artifacts,
such as a grainy structure or appearance, too few colours causing colour
blocks and a lack of texture or a lack of continuity in the colour.
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Even though the artifacts cannot be readily seen, one bit-plane (for exam-
ple, the LSB plane) can be plotted and inspected. This attack is especially
applicable to palette images for LSB embedding in indices to the palette.
If, at the same time, the message is embedded sequentially, one can have a
convincing argument towards the presence of a hidden message in an image.
Another method consists of selecting a speciﬁc area of an image and
magnifying it, to try to ﬁnd any lack of continuity where it is expected, or a
lack of colour variation where it is expected.
Finally, it is interesting to note that distortions introduced into an image
may resemble JPEG compression noise for instance. This noise can become
quite obvious when the combined image is compared to the original cover
images. Without the beneﬁt of using the cover image, such noise may pass
for an integral part of the image and go unnoticed. Although visual detection
is simple to do, it is hard to automate [87].
4.5.2 Colour Palette Observation
Palette-based images such as GIF images, are a class of images for which
steganalysis methods have been proposed in the past. Since pixel values in
a palette image are represented by indices into a colour look-up table which
contains the actual colour RGB value, even minor modiﬁcations to these
indices can result in annoying artifacts. Visual inspection or simple statistics
from such stego-images can yield enough tell-tale evidence, to discriminate
between stego and cover-images, since an 8 bit colour table only contains 128
diﬀerent colours.
To counteract this, embedding techniques proposed in EzStego (a steganog-
raphy tool downloadable from www.stego.com, but no longer available), ﬁrst
sorts the colour pallette so that the colour diﬀerences between consecutive
colours are minimised. It then embeds the message bits in the LSB of the
colour indices in the sorted pallette, therefore minimising the visual artifacts.
Fridrich et al. [27] show that precise results in detection are obtained
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using colour palette observation, but at the cost of expensive processing time
and sometimes with problems locating the exact embedded region.
4.5.3 Chi Square / Pair of Values (PoVs) Observation
When using LSB substitution, during the embedding process, ﬁxed sets
of PoVs emerge. A pixel with an original value of 2 would become 3 if the
bit to embed were 1, for example. It would remain 2 if the bit to embed
were 0. Using this logic, Pﬁtzman and Westﬁeld [87] introduced a powerful
statistical attack that can be applied to any steganographic technique, in
which a ﬁxed set of PoVs are ﬂipped into each other to embed the message
bits. This method is based on statistical analyses of PoVs exchanged during
message embedding. As the number of pixels for which LSB has been replaced
increases, the frequencies of both values of each PoV tend to become equal.
So for example if an image has 50 pixels that have a value 2 and 100 pixels
that have a value 3, then after LSB embedding of the entire LSB plane the
expected frequencies of 2 and 3 are 75 and 75 respectively. This of course is
when the entire LSB plane is modiﬁed. However, as long as the embedded
message is large enough, there will be a statistically discernible ﬂattening of
PoV distributions and this fact is exploited by their steganalysis technique.
4.5.4 Regular Singular (RS) Steganalysis
Statistical measures on LSBs for detecting level of embedding is, on its
own, unreliable, as the LSB bit plane does not contain any easily recognisable
structure [27]. And even though it appears random, it has some relation
with other bit planes. RS Steganalysis exploits this property. Fridrich et
al. [27] developed a steganalytic technique based on this for detection of
LSB embedding in colour and grey-scale images. They analyse the capacity
for embedding lossless data in LSBs. Randomizing the LSBs decreases this
capacity. To examine an image, they deﬁne Regular groups (R) and Singular
groups (S) of pixels based on speciﬁc properties. Then with the help of
relative frequencies of these groups in the given image, they try to predict
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the levels of embedding, in the image obtained from the original image with
LSBs ﬂipped and the image obtained by randomising LSBs of the original
image.
4.5.5 DCT domain Steganalysis
A well known algorithm named F5 is used to store the information in DCT
coeﬃcients leading to change in DCT histogram. Fridrich et al. [30, 28] have
demonstrated that this change is proportional to the level of embedding.
They have also shown that, if an image is cropped by 4 rows and 4 columns,
one can recover the original DCT histogram.
The basic assumption here is that the quantised DCT coeﬃcients are
robust to small distortions and after cropping the newly calculated DCT
coeﬃcients will not exhibit clusters due to quantisation. Also, because the
cropped stego image is visually similar to the cover image, many macroscopic
characteristics of the cover image will be roughly preserved. After predicting
DCT coeﬃcient's histogram in the original image and comparing it with that
of a stegoed image, the hidden message length can be calculated. Tools such
as Outguess [66] have been developed to counter this attack. Fridrich et al.
[29] have developed techniques using blockiness introduced in images due to
histogram equalisation, to expose Outguess' counter-measure.
4.5.6 Remarks
The steganalysis techniques described in the previous sections are gener-
ally speciﬁc to a particular embedding algorithm. Avcibas et al. [4] attempted
to detect the presence of hidden information regardless of the technique used,
essentially by building up a classiﬁer based on a training set of cover-images
and stego-images created from a variety of steganography algorithms. This
was done by identifying which statistical feature of an image is disturbed af-
ter the steganographic algorithm is applied. The accuracy of this technique
was reported by the author to be quite acceptable.
StegDetect [65] is a stand alone utility developed by Niels Provos, a doc-
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toral graduate of the University of Michigan. Licensed under the GNU Gen-
eral Public License (GNU GPL), it is available for download in source code
form and as a Microsoft Windows executable binary. Stegdetect can ﬁnd hid-
den information in images using steganography schemes implemented in F5,
Invisible Secrets, JPHide, Outguess, Camouﬂage, and JSteg. It also contains
a Graphical User Interface called Xsteg.
StegSecret [58] is a steganalysis open source project (GNU/GPL). It is a
Java-based multi-platform steganalysis tool which detects hidden information
embedded by popular steganographic methods. It detects EOF, LSB, DCTs
and other techniques. The author, Alfonso Muñoz, is currently working on
implementing algorithms, to detect other steganography algorithm.
More information on steganalysis tools is made available on the Computer
Forensics, Cybercrime and Steganography Resources website [?, ?].
4.6 Conclusion
Although research in steganography did not attract as much interest as
watermarking in terms of the number of studies, the literature review con-
ducted on both steganography and watermarking techniques, exhibits similar
conclusions:
 LSB embedding in the spatial domain is simpler to implement and
requires less processing power, while being generally less resistant to
compression and ﬁltering transformations. Embedding in the spatial
domain of an image oﬀers larger embedding capacity, but the hidden
information seems easier to detect using statistical analysis tools.
 DCT, DFT and more recently DWT techniques have shown they better
resist compression and ﬁltering attacks, but are not performing as well
when it comes to resisting geometric attacks. Embedding in the DWT
domain seems to outperform DCT embedding, especially in terms of
compression survival. Embedding in Frequency Domain makes hidden
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information more diﬃcult to detect, but the embedding capacity is
directly proportional to the increased distortion of an image.
 Isolating and using regions of interest in an image to embed the data
is a way of increasing the robustness of an algorithm to the detriment
of capacity.
Invisibility, robustness and capacity are often used to evaluate watermarking
methods. A preferred algorithm, as discussed in Chapter 2, should show a
good trade-oﬀ between these three requirements.
Placing watermark information into the perceptually signiﬁcant portions
of data guarantees robustness against large numbers of attacks like compres-
sion, ﬁltering, and scaling. Furthermore, placing such information into the
perceptually insigniﬁcant portions guarantees robustness against attacks like
histogram equalization [55].
As mentioned in Cox et al. [22], robustness to geometrical transforms
remains one of the most diﬃcult outstanding areas of watermarking research.
Various algorithms and theories have been proposed for a watermark to resist
geometric transformations such as rotation, scaling and transformation. A
survey from Zheng et al. [88] has shown that each current method has its
own advantages and disadvantages.
As seen in the previous sections, there are multiple data hiding method-
ologies and algorithms, each solving a particular facet of the watermarking
problem, while no technique outperforms the others from all points of view.
Zheng et al. [88] have published an extensive survey of Rotation Scale Trans-
lation (RST) invariant image watermarking algorithms in 2007 (summarised
results in Appendix A).
Having reached this point, it becomes clear that most of the watermarking
and steganography schemes are applied to grey-scale images, or colour images
ﬁrst transformed into grey-scale images before the embedding phase would
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occur. However their application to colour images might not be completely
adequate since they do not take into consideration the implication of the
Human Visual System and in particular its sensitivity to colour brightness
and perception. In order to explore this, further research into the HVS and
the various colour models was needed. The outcome of this investigation is
outlined in the next section.
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5 COLOUR SPACES ANDWATERMARKING
5.1 Introduction
More recent watermarking studies [57, 48] have turned their attention to
colour images rather than grey-scale images. Eﬀectively, colour may be more
than just an extension of grey scale. It is considered as a key element for a
number of image processing systems. Photoshop and Macromedia Fireworks
are such examples of image processing software. In particular, colour space
transforms have played a central role in coding, compression and transmission
applications, in television, video and image processing. Colour also plays a
major role in pattern recognition and digital multimedia [34], where colour
based-features and colour segmentations have proven eﬀective in indexing
and retrieving image content.
Alternative colour spaces from the traditional RGB have also been stud-
ied. This is motivated in part by the fact that the exploitation of colour
spaces (in digital video compression in particular) oﬀers important colour
information redundancy, which can be used for the purpose of hiding infor-
mation without it being perceptible to the human eye.
The aim of this chapter is to explore in more detail how some colour spaces
may be exploited for the beneﬁt of providing a more robust watermarking
scheme.
5.2 Colour Spaces in the context of watermarking
Liu and Chou [48] have compared the eﬃcacy of a watermarking scheme
between three diﬀerent colour spaces (YCbCr, XYZ, CIElab). The algorithm
used the frequency domain, extracting the wavelet coeﬃcient with highest
perceptual redundancy in each colour band, as reproduced in Figure 10, using
MATLAB [34].
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Figure 10: First level DWT decomposition in RGB colour channels
To do so, the DWT is performed independently on each colour channel.
Depending on the subband targeted, ﬁltering blocks of varying sizes are ap-
plied and the minimum value of the Just Noticeable Coeﬃcients (JND) are
targeted for embedding. Finally the inverse DWT is performed to rebuild
the combined image.
The objectives of using the above technique are ﬁrstly to ensure water-
mark invisibility, and secondly to evaluate the robustness against attacks in
each colour space. The watermark used is a black and white image of size
20 by 40 pixels. The Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) values above 40dbs
for each colour space and the more subjective visual inspection between the
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original and the combined image demonstrates the watermark invisibility.
The combined image is then attacked using JPEG compression, low-pass
ﬁltering, zero-mean Gaussian noise addition, scaled down by a factor of 4
and scaled up by a factor of 4.
The authors use the bit error rate between the original and the extracted
watermark after attack, which is simply a correlation resulting from the com-
parison between each watermark bit (original versus extracted).
After compression attacks, the bit error rate of the extracted watermark
is the lowest for the watermarking scheme that is carried out in the YCbCr
colour space. Results show that watermarks hidden in the YCbCr and XYZ
colour spaces in particular, are better recovered after JPEG compression
attacks.
Similar results are noticed with Gaussian noise attacks. These results
demonstrates that the YCbCr and XYZ colour spaces have large amount of
perceptual redundancy for colour pixels in this colour space. The larger the
extent of perceptual redundancy, the greater the strength of the watermark
signal that can be embedded, and the higher the robustness of the embedded
watermark.
Although the variety of attacks is quite limited, the YCbCr colour space
shows better overall robustness to attacks while preserving the watermark
invisibility. This study also shows that there are special considerations to
follow during the development of a watermarking algorithm in non-RGB
colour spaces. When processing information in a non-RGB colour space, it is
important not to create combinations of values which result in the generation
of invalid RGB colours. e.g, given that RGB has a normalised value of (1,
1, 1), the resulting YCbCr value is (235, 128, 128) as per the mathematical
formula in section 5.3.2. If Cb and Cr are manipulated to create a value of
(235, 64, 73), the corresponding RGB value becomes (0.6, 1.29, 0.56), i.e.,
the green value exceeds 1. Robustness tests done against geometric attacks
appear limited. Previous studies suggest that DWT algorithms perform well
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against compression and ﬁltering. This study conﬁrms this but goes no
further.
5.3 RGB & YCbCr Colour Spaces
In this section, the adaptation of human visual perception to colours in
the diﬀerent colour spaces is discussed.
A colour space is a method by which one can specify, create and visualise
colour. As humans, colour is deﬁned by its attributes of brightness, hue and
colour intensity. A computer deﬁnes a colour in terms of the excitations of
red, green and blue phosphors on the Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) faceplate.
A printing press deﬁnes a colour in terms of the reﬂectance and absorbency
of cyan, magenta, yellow and black inks on the paper.
Since the HVS has a limited sensitivity in perceiving visual information,
it is well understood that there exists a considerable amount of perceptual
redundancy in colour images [33]. The perceptual redundancy of a particular
colour is represented by a colour region in which each colour cannot be dis-
tinguishable; i.e. the colour diﬀerence is close to zero. Through making the
embedded watermarks part of the perceptual redundancy in colour images,
watermark insertion can be achieved with transparency.
The three most popular colour models are RGB (used mostly in computer
graphics), YIQ, YUV or YCbCr (used in video systems) and CMYK (used
in colour printing). Only RGB and YCbCr colour spaces will be presented
here for their relevance to the methodology discussed in the next chapter.
See Appendix B for a presentation of other colour spaces. All mathematical
formulae presented in the following sections (and Appendix B) were taken
from the Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage (CIE) [8].
5.3.1 RGB Colour Space
RGB colours are known as additive primary colours, because a colour is
produced by adding diﬀerent quantities of the three components, red, green,
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and blue [33]. The RGB colour space is widely used throughout computer
graphics. It is the most prevalent colour space as colour displays use red,
green and blue, which are the three primary additive colours. They are
represented by a three-dimensional, Cartesian coordinate system (see Figure
11).
Figure 11: RGB Colour Space [34]
The diﬀerent colours are points within the boundaries of this cube, with
values ranging from [0; 1] (or [0; 255] in the digital world). While RGB
channel format is a natural scheme for representing real-world colour, each
of the three channels is highly correlated with the other two. This can be
demonstrated by independently viewing the R, G, and B channels of a given
image, where the entire image is clearly deﬁned in each channel. The RGB
colour space is device dependent. For example the colour produced using
pixel values will alter as the brightness and contrast on a computer screen
changes.
Two main conditions apply to the RGB model:
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 Any of the three components must be of equal bandwidth to generate
any colour within the RGB colour cube,
 Modifying the intensity of a pixel requires the modiﬁcation of the three
channel values.
5.3.2 YUV, YIQ and YCbCr Colour Spaces
These are the television transmission colour spaces. YUV is used in Eu-
ropean televisions, while YIQ is used in Northern American television. The
luma information of YUV, YIQ and YCbCr is stored in the Y channel, while
the colour information is stored in the U and V channels (for YUV), I and
Q channels (for YIQ) and Cb and Cr channels (for YCbCr). The YIQ is
derived from the YUV colour space. They are both used for analogue video
(PAL and SECAM). The YCbCr colour space, developed as part of ITU-R
BT.601 (world wide digital component video standard), is a scaled and oﬀset
version of the YUV colour space. Digital video is a series of digital images
displayed in rapid succession at a constant rate.
The basic equation applied to convert between RGB and YCbCr is:
Y = 0.299R + 0.587G + 0.114B
Cb = -0.172R - 0.339G + 0.511B + 128
Cr = 0.511R - 0.428G - 0.083B + 128
The conversion from YCbCr back to RGB is as follow:
R = Y + 1.371(Cr - 128)
G = Y - 0.698(Cr - 128)
B = Y + 1.732(Cb - 128)
It is assumed Y is within the range [0; 1], and Cb and Cr are within the
range [-0.5; 0.5] if Red, Green, and Blue are within the range [0; 1]
The fact that YCbCr is applied in digital video (YUV and YIQ are for
analogue video), suggests that the YCbCr colour space could be used to good
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Figure 12: YCbCr Colour Space
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eﬀect with still digital images:
 Digital images are the building block of digital video
 There is a linear relationship between RGB and YCbCr
5.4 Conclusion
YCbCr is a component colour space used by digital video. Unlike the
RGB model, YCbCr breaks the visual information into black and white
(luma) signal and two colour components. It separates luminance from
chrominance (lightness from colour). With many more rods than cones, the
human eye is more attuned to brightness and less to colour diﬀerences. Hence
the YCbCr colour system allows more attention to be paid to Y, and less to
Cb and Cr. As a result, using Cb and Cr values to embed the watermark,
rather than the Y channel, should achieve watermark invisibility.
Using the same line of thought, it may be possible to use a blind wa-
termarking technique in the YCbCr colour domain. One would assume that
the extra information needed to extract the original watermark without prior
knowledge of the embedding process, will not aﬀect the invisibility quality of
the proposed scheme. The second important point to make about the YCbCr
colour space is that the translation between it and the RGB colour space is
linear and simple, therefore requiring little processing.
The RGB colour space will also be exploited for the simple fact that it is
readily available to use on computer systems, therefore requiring little com-
putation overhead. Since it is important to preserve the correlation between
each component (R, G, B), the same amount of watermark will be embedded
in each colour channel respectively, using an additive LSB technique. Pre-
vious research in grey-scale image watermarking has shown that it is more
robust to spread the watermark across the entire image space rather than
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localising it to speciﬁc image regions. For this reason, the watermark im-
age will be rescaled to the original image size before embedding. It is hoped
that using a hybrid watermarking system will improve the general robustness
against most digital image attacks.
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6 IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 Introduction
In many of the studies reviewed, watermarking algorithms are based ei-
ther on an additive, a substitution, a multiplicative or a quantisation process,
at pixel bit or coeﬃcient levels. The watermark is extracted from the marked
image either blindly or with a secret key or with the original image.
Most of the watermarking schemes using keys are symmetric (i.e. the em-
bedding and detection keys are identical). While several methods have been
proposed to watermark grey level images, only a few have been designed for
colour images. Most of the time, these methods integrate colour informa-
tion and the HVS by using histogram and quantization schemes, frequency
domain transforms or spatial domain processing.
In light of the literature survey, it was originally proposed to use an
hybrid watermarking scheme (in the spatial and frequency domains). This
method and the results obtained from it are brieﬂy discussed. However,
due to disappointing results particularly after JPEG compression where the
watermark was lost, it was decided to implement a new hybrid (JPEG image
watermark and ASCII watermark) scheme in the RGB and the YCbCr colour
spaces respectively, using the additive LSB technique (in RGB) and the pixel
value addition technique (in YCbCr), following investigation of studies in
various colour spaces.
The creation of a software tool to implement and evaluate the afore-
mentioned novel approach against attack, was realised using MATLAB. It
is a powerful matrix based programming language used mainly for scientiﬁc
simulation programs. Use was made of MATLAB's comprehensive image
processing and wavelet toolbox code library. Throughout this chapter, refer-
ences are made to the code used in the implementation. Each code module
is a distinct method, representing a main step in the watermark embedding
and extraction process, in order to improve the code's modularity, readability
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and comprehensibility.
The following section describes in detail the watermark's embedding and
extraction algorithm, followed by the evaluation methodologies.
6.2 Methodology
6.2.1 Motivations
Some fundamental diﬀerences between steganography and watermarking
have made the choice of basing the proposed watermarking algorithm on a
strong steganographic model quite diﬃcult:
 Steganography algorithm emphasis is generally more on capacity and
invisibility rather than robustness, as opposed to watermarking tech-
niques which in order to be successful must show invisibility and resis-
tance to attacks as a priority.
 With steganography one has the beneﬁt of choosing the host image,
which can help in developing the most appropriate algorithm to exploit
image speciﬁc features, as seen for example in the skin tone algorithm
proposed by Cheddad et al. [10]. With watermarking, no such choice
exists.
As seen in chapter 4, exploiting the frequency domain with DWT naturally
strengthens the watermarking algorithm against JPEG compression and ﬁl-
tering attacks. On this basis, a second level DWT algorithm was developed
as a test, using Matlab, to verify the natural robustness of watermarks to
image compression. To do so, the image was processed based on the following
pseudo-code:
[cA1,cH1,cV1,cD1] = dwt2(cover_image,'haar');
k = value added to original coefficient;
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for pixel_position=1 to watermark_total_length
if (watermark[pixel_position] == 0)
if(cH1[pixel_position] >= 0)
cH1[pixel_position] = cH1[pixel_position]+k;
end
if(cV1[pixel_position] >= 0)
cV1[pixel_position] = cV1[pixel_position]+k;
end
end
end
watermarked_image = idwt2(cA1,cH1,cV1,cD1,'haar',[cover_img_height,cover_img_width]);
The MATLAB code written to implement this algorithm can be seen in
Appendix C.
The original grey-scaled image lena and the black and white watermark
image copyright, of size 50 by 20 pixels, were used for the purpose of this
test. After embedding the watermark, the original image and the combined
image were compared visually (see Figure 13).
Figure 13: Original and watermarked lena image compared
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The PSNR was also computed, with a result of 57.7 dbs, conﬁrming
that the original image could not be distinguished from the combined image
obtained after the embedding process. The embedding process time and the
extraction process time were both similar with a time value of 1.2 seconds.
The original and the recovered watermark after embedding and extraction
are compared in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Original and extracted watermark
Although there is a slight loss of quality, the recovered watermark is
clearly identiﬁable.
MATLAB was used to perform a JPEG compression test on the com-
bined image. The watermarked lena image was compressed by a ratio of
10% and 20%, using the built in JPEG-compression-MATLAB-method. The
watermark was then extracted (see Figure 15).
Figure 15: Extracted watermark after JPEG compression
Results obtained after JPEG compression were very disappointing. The
embedded watermark has lost its original resolution, implying that the DWT
implementation used for the purpose of this test cannot be used reliably for
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the purpose of watermarking. This unexpected discovery prompted a re-think
to the approach.
Watermarking algorithms studied by Cox [21] demonstrate that in most
cases they only resolve some of the potential attacks. A practical example
of this is found in Adobe Photoshop, in the form of a tool, designed by
Digimarc, to embed a numerical tag into photos, using wavelet encoding
techniques, which illustrates its resistance to many basic distortions but not
all: for example rotating an image by 45 degrees before applying blurring
and sharpening ﬁlters will destroy the watermark.
To increase the chances of watermark survival after multiple attacks, a
combinative watermarking approach is suggested by Shih [73](p. 65-75),
based on previous research done in this area by Tsai [78] and Shih [72], to
provide for high capacity watermarks, by splitting the watermark into two
parts; one part is embedded into the spatial domain while the other part is
embedded into the frequency domain. The LSB technique is adopted in the
spatial domain, using a pseudo random number generator to locate the pixels
for the embedding process. Embedding in the lower frequency components to
avoid loss after compression is the technique chosen in the frequency domain.
A random permutation of the watermark is also used, showing a better resis-
tance to cropping, in particular. Chemak et al. [15], encode the watermark
and embed the result in both the frequency and the spatial domain. They
use the 5/3 wavelet decomposition adapted for JPEG2000 compression. Im-
ages transformed using this algorithm are naturally resistant to this kind of
attack. It also has the advantage of not losing coeﬃcient value precision as
it is an integer to integer conversion. They propose to modify pixels lumi-
nance values using the LSB2 (second least signiﬁcant bit) as their embedding
technique in the spatial domain.
Both studies suggest an improved robustness by combining frequency and
spatial domains in their algorithm, to the detriment of performance, due to
higher complexity. However, it is suggested that the success of a watermark-
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ing scheme should be founded not only on robustness and invisibility, but
also on the simplicity of its algorithm, to enable better commercial viability.
While processing power (CPU and memory) increases all the time and be-
comes cheaper with every new hardware release, image manipulations require
large amount of memory and fast CPU cycles to be eﬃcient. This is not an
issue when serving individual needs. However, for a commercial entity such
as Getty Images, which stores millions of images, algorithm eﬃciency would
certainly be an important decision factor. For example, if it takes 2 seconds
to embed a watermark into an image using algorithm 1 and it takes 6 seconds
using algorithm 2, it would cost three times more in hardware investment to
choose the less eﬃcient algorithm. If the most eﬃcient algorithm can per-
form as well as the less eﬃcient one (in terms of robustness and invisibility),
the ﬁnal decision becomes easy to make.
Hence, this study proposes a completely diﬀerent hybrid approach, built
upon the assumption that combining both spatial features and colour space
might improve robustness. So rather than utilising a grey-scale image, ad-
vantage of the colour redundancy that the YCbCr colour space oﬀers will be
taken, as discussed in section 5.2. A relatively simple algorithm for improved
performance has been focused on, inspired by two techniques (additive pixel
value and LSB substitution) widely used in steganography. The following
combined RGB and YCbCr watermarking technique is proposed:
 Non blind, additive pixel value in the RGB components, using a JPEG
black and white watermark (50 by 50 pixels).
 Blind, LSB substitution in the Cb and Cr components of the YCbCr
colour space, using an ASCII text watermark. This technique enables
to hide more information, without compromising invisibility.
The main motivation in adopting this approach is to study:
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 How well any of the two watermarks survive a large battery of attacks,
 What impact embedding in the two diﬀerent colour space has on wa-
termark invisibility,
 How diﬃcult it is to detect and potentially destroy the watermarks,
 How eﬃcient this algorithm is in terms of processing time.
It is important to note that the proposed algorithm did evolve during the
development phase from its original conception, to address practical prob-
lems met along the way. Explanations and justiﬁcations are provided where
appropriate in the following sections.
6.2.2 Embedding Phase
The process of watermark embedding is divided into two phases.
Phase 1
First the image watermark FL is resized to the host image size, in order to
distribute the watermark evenly into the host image, to increase resistance
to attacks, as shown in the literature review. The RGB Image is decomposed
into three matrices corresponding to R, G and B channels, so is the resized
watermark (see Figure 16).
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Figure 16: Watermark Embedding in the RGB channels
For each host image R, G, B matrix value, the equivalent watermark R,
G, B matrix weighted value (watermark value * k) is added so that:
 Combined_image_R is equal to min ( original_R + (watermark_R *
k), 255 )
 Combined_image_G is equal to min ( original_G + (watermark_G *
k), 255 )
 Combined_image_B is equal to min ( original_B + (watermark_B *
k), 255 )
where k is a constant that increases the strength of the watermark. k equals
to 0.01 is found to be the optimum in this proposed algorithm. Below this
value, the watermark becomes imperceptible after extraction. Above this
value, the watermark becomes visible in the combined image (Image 1).
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Each new computed value is then recalibrated to an integer, in the range
0 to 255, before recombining the 3 channels together to form Image 1.
For example:
if original_R is equal to 254 and watermark_R is equal to 254, then
the rounded value of combined_image_R is equal to 256 (254 + (254 ∗
0.01)), which is clearly outside the upper range of 255. In this case, com-
bined_image_R is set to 255.
Here is the pseudo-code (See the function insertWatermark, in Appendix
D):
resizeimage( watermark, [original_image_width, original_image_length] );
for width = 1 to total_image_width
for length = 1 to total_image_length
red_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 1 ) +
(resized_watermark_image( length, width, 1 ) * 0.01);
green_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 2 ) +
(resized_watermark_image( length, width, 2 ) * 0.01);
blue_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 3 ) +
(resized_watermark_image( length, width, 3 ) * 0.01);
end
end
combined_image = combine(red_pixels, green_pixels, blue_pixels);
combined_image = min( combined_image, 255 );
Phase 2
The combined RGB image (Image 1 in Figure 16) is then converted to YCbCr.
The basic equation applied to convert between RGB and YCbCr is:
Y = 0.299R + 0.587G + 0.114B
Cb = -0.172R - 0.339G + 0.511B + 128
Cr = 0.511R - 0.428G - 0.083B + 128
The 3 component vectors (Y, Cb, Cr) are extracted. The ASCII water-
mark is converted to a bit stream, using 8 bits for each ASCII character.
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Although not implemented here, the watermark can be encrypted before the
binary conversion to make it unreadable, if discovered.
Only the Cb and Cr channels are selected to embed the watermark. Each
channel is converted into a 2D matrix, which is segmented into blocks. The
optimal block size, which shows the best compromise between capacity, im-
perceptibility and retrieval after attacks, is deﬁned. The reason for using
blocks is based on the fact that there is a better statistical chance of recover-
ing the watermark after geometric transformation. On the other hand, this
may increase the risk of detection due to the repeated patterns, if the block
size is guessed. Setting every LSB of a block to the same value naturally
leaves a print, which may be detected using steganalysis tools for exam-
ple. One way of guessing the block size would be to use iterations starting
with a block the size of the image. After each iteration, the block size is
reduced by one pixel, until a pattern is discovered. A practical solution to
this potential problem (although not implemented for simplicity and clarity)
would be to alternate the use of the least signiﬁcant bit (LSB) and the second
least signiﬁcant bit (LSB2) for embedding the watermark, based on a private
key randomly generated, containing a stream of ones and zeros equal to the
length of the watermark binary stream, so that for each watermark bit:
 If the corresponding private key bit position is zero, the LSB is used
 If the corresponding private key bit position is one, the LSB2 is used
This would presume that the private key is output to the user when it is
randomly created and it has to be associated with the original image used.
A relational database storing both information within the same record would
ensure that such a record is safely kept.
Each block position is computed as seen in Figure 17 (based on the algo-
rithm proposed by Lin and Delp [47]).
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Figure 17: ASCII watermark embedding in the CbCr channels
1. For every even pixel value of the combined image, if the watermark bit
is set to 1, then the LSB of Cb is set to 0 for each Cb element in the
block. The LSB of Cr is set to 1.
2. For every odd pixel value of the combined image, if the watermark bit
is set to 1, then the LSB of Cb is set to 1 for each Cb element in the
block. The LSB of Cr is set to 0.
This is repeated until the watermark binary stream is fully embedded. The
combined image is then converted back to RGB and saved. The conversion
from YCbCr back to RGB is as follow:
R = Y + 1.371(Cr - 128)
G = Y - 0.698(Cr - 128)
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B = Y + 1.732(Cb - 128)
An important consideration regarding this method in the YCbCr is the
limited length of the text watermark, depending on the image size and the
block size. This is clearly demonstrated by the following equation:
max_watermark_character =
(
imagesize
blocksize
)2
8
where 8 is the number of bits used to deﬁne one single ASCII character.
Here is the pseudo-code (See the function encodInYCbCr, in Appendix
D):
[Y, Cb, Cr] = rgb2ycbcr(image(R, G, B));
watermark = ascii_to_binary(text);
position = 0;
for each block in image
for each lsb in the block
if (watermark_bit[position] == 1)
Cb_lsb = 0;
Cr_lsb = 1;
else
Cb_lsb = 1;
Cr_lsb = 0;
end
end
if(position > watermark_bit.length) stop;
else position++;
end
combined_image = ycbcr2rgb(Y, Cb, Cr);
6.2.3 Extraction Phase
The watermark extraction is also done in two phases.
Phase 1
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The watermarked RGB image (Watermarked Image in Figure 18) is converted
to YCbCr following the same equation referenced in phase 2 of section 6.2.2.
The 3 component vectors (Y, Cb, Cr) are extracted.
Only the Cb and Cr channels are selected to extract the watermark. Each
channel is converted into a 2D matrix, which is segmented into blocks the
same block size used during the embedding phase.
Each block position is computed as seen in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Watermark extraction from the CbCr channels
For each block in Cb and Cr channels in even positions (even rows and
columns starting at position [0, 0]):
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 In Cb the following condition is tested: the count of bits equal to 0 is
greater than the count of bits equal to 1.
 In Cr the following condition is tested: the count of bits equal to 1 is
greater than the count of bits equal to 0.
 If the two assumptions are true, then the watermark bit is set to 1.
 If the two assumptions are false, then the watermark bit is set to 0.
The same process is reproduced for all odd block positions (odd rows and
columns starting at position [1, 1]), but this time the opposite values are
taken in each channel, such as:
 In Cb the following condition is tested: the count of bits equal to 1 is
greater than the count of bits equal to 0.
 In Cr the following condition is tested: the count of bits equal to 0 is
greater than the count of bits equal to 1.
 If the two assumptions are true, then the watermark bit is set to 1.
 If the two assumptions are false, then the watermark bit is set to 0.
The watermark bit stream obtained is converted back to ASCII characters.
The watermarked image is then converted back to RGB, before starting phase
2.
Here is the pseudo-code (See the function decodeInYCbCr, in Appendix
D):
[Y, Cb, Cr] = rgb2ycbcr(image(R, G, B));
position = 0;
for each block in image
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count_0 = 0;
count_1 = 0;
for each pixel in block
if(Cb_lsb == 0 or Cr_lsb == 1) then count_1++;
if(Cb_lsb == 1 or Cr_lsb == 0) then count_0++;
end
if(count_1 > count_0)
watermark_bit[position] = 1;
else
watermark_bit[position] = 0;
end
if(position > watermark_bit.length)
stop;
else
position++;
end
end
watermark_text = binary_to_ascii(watermark_bit);
image[R, G, B] = ycbcr2rgb([Y, Cb, Cr]);
Phase 2
The combined image RGB (containing the watermark) is decomposed into
each colour channel as seen in Figure 19. The original image is also decom-
posed into each colour channel.
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Figure 19: Watermark extraction from the RGB channels
For each R, G, B matrix value from the original image, the equivalent
watermarked image R, G, B matrix weighted value (combined image value *
k) is subtracted so that:
 Watermark_R = original_R - (combined_image_R * k)
 Watermark_G = original_G - (combined_image_G * k)
 Watermark_B = original_B - (combined_image_B * k)
where k is the same constant used in the embedding process (k = 0.01).
Each new computed watermark value is then recalibrated to be in the range
0 to 255, before recombining the 3 resultant channels together to form the
original watermark. The watermark obtained is ﬁnally resized to its original
size.
Here is the pseudo-code (See the function extractWatermark, in Appendix
D):
for width = 1 to total_image_width
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for length = 1 to total_image_length
red_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 1 ) -
(watermarked_image( length, width, 1 ) * 0.01);
green_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 2 ) -
(watermarked_image( length, width, 2 ) * 0.01);
blue_pixels[length, width] = original_image( length, width, 3 ) -
(watermarked_image( length, width, 3 ) * 0.01);
end
end
large_watermark = combine(red_pixels, green_pixels, blue_pixels);
watermark_FL = min( large_watermark, 255 );
watermark_FL = downsize_to_original(watermark_FL);
After phases 1 and 2, the two watermarks are extracted and clearly identi-
ﬁed. Embedding into the YCbCr allows one to extract the ASCII watermark
without needing the original image, nor any information regarding the wa-
termark. This is called a blind technique. However, the original image was
needed in order to extract the original watermark from the RGB channels.
It is called a non blind (or informed) technique. The beneﬁt of using a blind
technique in terms of image management is appreciated, as there is no need
to store the original image.
6.3 Image Attacks
A series of attacks have been applied for each main digital image attack
category described in Chapter 3. To do so, some attacks have been have
automated (scaling, rotation, compression, noise addition) using MATLAB
(see code in Appendix D). The proposed algorithm has also been tested
against JPEG 2000 compression attacks.
Manual attacks have been applied using Macromedia Fireworks, a popu-
lar image manipulation software used to design and enhance digital images.
These attacks cover low pass ﬁltering, gaussian blur, change of brightness
and contrast, cropping, sharpening and histogram attacks.
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Finally, Stirmark was also used to test against self similarity attacks,
median ﬁlter attacks and to measure the strength of the proposed algorithm.
6.4 Measure of Invisibility
It is generally agreed that, despite the soﬁstication of the HVS, detect-
ing diﬀerences between two images is diﬃcult to do objectively. One person
may perceive subtle variations that another will not notice. For this reason,
mathematical formulae have been deﬁned to rationalise these subtle diﬀer-
ences. Many studies use the PSNR based on the mean-squared error (MSE)
between two images, which is computed from the RGB colour components.
The PSNR value is high when the diﬀerence between the cover image and the
stego image is small. Above 38db, the human eye cannot notice the decline
of image quality [89]. The PSNR is computed as follows:
PSNR = 10 log10
(
C2max
MSE
)
where Cmax represent the highest pixel value present in the image (maximum
of 255).
For a cover image whose width and height areM and N , MSE is deﬁned
as:
MSE = 1M×N
∑M
x=1
∑N
y=1 (Sxy − Cxy)2
where x and y are the image co-ordinates, S is the generated watermarked
image and C is the cover image.
Recently, Lukac and Plataniotis [52] have demonstrated that since the
PSNR is a component average and treats equally the errors whatever the
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image content might be, it is not correlated closely enough with the human
perception. If the watermark is precisely embedded into textured regions or
edges, the PSNR is then inadequate to measure the image quality. Wang
[82] illustrates this point by showing images which have been transformed
but retain the same PSNR measure, where one mark may be invisible while
another may be drastically visible. Several alternatives have been proposed
[25, 82] to overcome the PSNR limitation. Wang [82] presented a Structural
Similarity (SSIM) index, as a method of improving the similarity measure
between two images. The SSIM index is a full reference metric, in other
words, the measuring of image quality is based on an initial uncompressed or
distortion-free image as reference. The SSIM metric is calculated on various
windows of an image. The measure between two windows x and y of common
size N by N is:
SSIM(x,y) =
2(µxµy+c1)(2σxy+c2)
(µ2x+µ
2
y+c1)(σ
2
x+σ
2
y+c2)
where:
µx is the average of x;
µyis the average of y;
σ2x is the variance of x;
σ2y is the variance of y;
µxyis the covariance of x and y;
c1 = (k1L)
2, c2 = (k2L)
2 are two variables to stabilise the division with
weak denominator;
L is the dynamic range of the pixel values (typically 2#bits/pixel − 1;
k1= 0.01 and k2 = 0.03 by default;
In order to evaluate the image quality this formula is applied only on the
luma component. The resultant SSIM index is a real number value between
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-1 and 1, and the value 1 is only reachable if two sets of data are identical.
Typically it is calculated on window (block) sizes of 8 by 8. The window
can be displaced pixel-by-pixel on the image but it is proposed to use only a
subgroup of the possible windows to reduce the complexity of the calculation.
To conclude, both the PSNR and the SSIM metrics will be used to mea-
sure the visual diﬀerences between the original image and the combined im-
age. The PSNR has been used extensively in the past as a reference metric.
The SSIM is much more recent and is a candidate as a reasonable alternative.
6.5 Measure of Robustness
In order to measure the robustness of the proposed technique, apart from
the visual watermark comparison (original and extracted after attacks), an
objective way of measuring the watermark distortion after subjecting the
combined image to various attacks was required. These attacks include com-
mon image processing operations such as ﬁltering, compression, histogram
equalization, intensity adjustment, gamma correction and geometric trans-
formations like cropping, scaling, and rotation. One of the most popular dif-
ference distortion measures is the Normalized Mean Squared Error (NMSE)
metric which is deﬁned as:
NMSE =
∑
ij(y (i, j)− x (i, j))2/ ∑ijx2 (i, j)
This metric is used to evaluate the distortion which has occurred in the
extracted watermark logo after attacks. A correlation coeﬃcient, computed
by matching the pixel similarity between the original watermark and the
extracted one, is also used. A correlation coeﬃcient value of 1 means 100
percent match. The MATLAB code to compute both metrics is listed in
Appendix D, under the function named wSimilarity.
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Regarding the extracted ASCII watermark, the most objective method is
that the text must match exactly what was embedded in the YCbCr in order
to prove robustness to attacks. Although presence of ASCII characters after
extraction demonstrates that ASCII text was embedded in the ﬁrst place,
failure will be considered if more than a single character mismatch occurs,
as the text may not make sense any longer.
6.6 Steganalysis
To complete this experimentation, an evaluation of how detectable the
proposed algorithm is, is performed using Stegdetect [65] and StegSecret [58].
Both are often cited and used in steganography research studies. They can
detect a wide range of steganography algorithms. The current source code
version of Stegdetect is 0.6, released in September 2004. The latest beta
release (17/12/2007) of StegSecret is used. Both tools provide potentially
interesting feedback regarding detection, given that it's known the proposed
technique is inspired by LSB steganography.
6.7 Conclusion
The next chapter presents the test results and analysis.
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7 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the results of the experiments are reported and their in-
terpretation is given. Experiments were completed on a computer running
Microsoft Windows Vista, equipped with an Intel Core 2 Duo 2 GHz (Gi-
gahertz) CPU (Central Processing Unit) and 2 GB of RAM (Gigabytes of
Random Access Memory).
The strengths and weaknesses of the proposed algorithm were analysed,
as regards invisibility, robustness to attacks, potential detection using ste-
ganalysis tools and potential destruction using Stirmark. Although seven
test images have been used during experimentation (results can be seen in
Appendix E), only results based on lena image will be presented in this
section. But ﬁrst the reasons for the choice of images to test with will be
explained.
7.2 Image Database
It is important to test an image watermarking software on many diﬀerent
images and for fair comparison, the same set of sample images should always
be used [62].
Digital images can exhibit diﬀerent characteristics, interesting from the
signal processing point of view: textured or smooth areas, size, synthetic,
with straight edges, sharp, blur, brightness and contrast. It is diﬃcult to get
an exhaustive list of classes of pictures, and stock photo companies have a
lot of diﬃculties in setting up a satisfactory and uniform index.
Some image databases already exist for image processing research. The
USC-SIPI Image Database [80] is an example of such a database where one
can ﬁnd the classics, e.g lena, baboon, peppers, and so on. Although, the
copyright status of these images is not stated clearly, it was decided to use
these classics for testing the proposed algorithm:
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 They have been used extensively to test various steganography and
watermarking algorithms.
 In order to compare fairly the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed
algorithm to others, the same set of colour images had to be chosen.
Seven colour images were used in total, each of size 512 by 512 pixels: crown,
girl, lena, baboon, plane, peppers, and boat, as shown in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Host images and watermark image
Each image went through the same testing process:
 The image was ﬁrst loaded individually into the MATLAB Graphical
User Interface (GUI). See Appendix D for code reference of the GUI.
 A 50 by 50 pixels, black and white JPEG image (FL) was used as the
watermark image, to embed in the RGB space of the image, as shown
in Figure 20.
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 An ASCII text Copyright LYIT - 2011 was used as the second water-
mark, to embed in the YCbCr colour space of the image.
 After the embedding process, an invisibility test was performed on the
combined image, after inserting only one watermark, then the other,
then both. See Appendix D for code reference of the PSNR and SSIM
computation.
 Then each image was submitted to a battery of attacks. After each
attack, the extraction success of each watermark was reported. See
Appendix D for code reference of the test attacks using MATLAB and
Appendix E for test results.
 The combined image was submitted to two steganalysis tools (StegDe-
tect and StegSecret), to measure the probability of detection, by com-
paring the original image steganalysis results with the combined image
steganalysis results.
 Finally the combined image was submitted to Stirmark attacks to mea-
sure the degree of survival of each watermark.
lena was chosen as this experiment reference image because it is the most
widely used image throughout the literature. The image attack results for
the other images are available in Appendix E.
7.3 Invisibility Analysis
A visual test was performed to try to detect diﬀerences between the orig-
inal image and the combined image, for each image. As seen in Figure 21
for the particular case of image lena, the original image is 4.2.0.4-lena.tiﬀ
83
and the watermark image (after embedding ﬂ_small.jpg and the ASCII
text Copyright LYIT - 2011) is watermarked_img.bmp.
Figure 21: MATLAB GUI comparing the original lena image and lena
after the proposed hybrid watermarking method is performed
Ten persons, chosen randomly amongst family and friends, were given one
minute to look at the two images only, shown in Figure 21. Any evidence that
could distinguish the original from the watermarked image was previously
removed, such as the ﬁle name which appears below each image, in Figure
21. Each person was then asked if they could ﬁnd any diﬀerences between
the two images, and if yes to point them out. Four out of the ten persons
thought that the two images were the same. The remaining six suspected the
two images were not the same, but when asked to point out the diﬀerences,
no one was able to point them out with 100% conviction. 100% conviction
means without any hesitation nor change of opinion.
Having completed this simple subjective test, the PSNR and SSIM values
were also computed, after individual watermarks were embedded, and then
with the hybrid watermark. To do so, three tests were run in parallel:
 A ﬁrst test measured the PSNR and SSIM of the combined image after
embedding the image watermark in the RGB only.
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 A second test measured the PSNR and SSIM of the combined image
after embedding the ASCII watermark in the YCbCr only.
 A third test measured the PSNR and SSIM of the combined image after
embedding both watermarks.
A SSIM value of 1 means the two images compared are identical. A PSNR
value greater than 35 decibels means the two images compared are not visibly
diﬀerent. Table 4 summarises the results.
Colour Space RGB RGB YCbCr YCbCr Hybrid Hybrid
Images PSNR SSIM PSNR SSIM PSNR SSIM
crown 39.3 0.9909 48.29 0.9972 38.77 0.9882
girl 40.36 0.9988 48.86 0.9981 39.81 0.9967
lena 39.47 0.9991 48.55 0.9982 38.95 0.9972
plane 38.83 0.9995 47.93 0.9976 38.31 0.9971
boat 39.36 0.9989 48.34 0.9985 38.88 0.9973
pepper 38.94 0.9916 48.01 0.9982 38.43 0.9899
baboon 39.47 0.9995 48.56 0.9995 38.96 0.9989
Table 4: PSNR and SSIM Results
Looking at the results, the ﬁrst observation to make is that there is very
little diﬀerence between the PSNR values, from one image to another, within
each colour space, although each image tested has diﬀerent characteristics to
the others. For example, the PSNR values range between 38.83 and 40.36 in
the RGB, they range between 47.93 and 48.86 in the YCbCr and they range
between 38.31 and 39.81 using the hybrid embedding.
Embedding in the YCbCr only, also shows a higher PSNR value compares
to the RGB only. This ﬁnding might be explained by two reasons:
1. LSB embedding in the YCbCr has less visual impact than the additive
method in the RGB.
85
2. The image watermark binary payload is signiﬁcantly greater than the
ASCII watermark binary payload.
The SSIM values are all around 0.99, showing no appreciable diﬀerence be-
tween the original image and the watermarked image, regardless of the em-
bedding technique used and the colour space chosen. These results tally
with the visual inspection, in demonstrating the invisibility of the proposed
watermarking scheme. The comparable results, despite using very diﬀerent
images (from the set of seven images), also suggests that the proposed hy-
brid watermarking algorithm should remain invisible regardless of the kind
of image used.
7.4 Robustness Analysis
This section analyses each watermark survival after attacks against the
watermarked image lena. For each attack, the NMSE and the Correlation
coeﬃcient (R) are computed. Both metrics are used to evaluate the distortion
of the watermark image (FL logo) after attacks. As well as these two
metrics, a visual inspection on the extracted watermarks is performed to
judge their survival. Attacks are performed using various tools:
 MATLAB: annotated with (M).
 Macromedia Fireworks: annotated with (F).
 Stirmark: annotated with (S).
7.4.1 JPEG Compression Attack
JPEG is one of the most widely used compression algorithms and any wa-
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termarking system should be resilient to some degree of compression. JPEG
compression with diﬀerent quality factors are applied to the watermarked
image lena. Table 5 summarises the results.
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Compression
(%) (M)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
5 0.024521 0.84
45 0.024498 0.64
85 0.024067 0.30
95 0.022021 0.09
Table 5: Watermark survival results after JPEG compression
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It can be clearly seen that the ASCII text watermark has not survived any
level of JPEG compression. However the watermark image FL is still per-
ceivable up to 85% of compression (15% JPEG quality factor). At this level,
the image has lost its commercial value. A plotted NMSE and correlation
coeﬃcient values are illustrated in Figure 22.
Figure 22: NMSE and Correlation values of watermark at various JPEG
quality factors
The correlation coeﬃcient values computed and graphed in Figure 22,
reﬂect very precisely what can be observed of the watermark image after
extraction. In light of these results, the proposed algorithm is robust against
JPEG compression up to 85% compression.
7.4.2 JPEG 2000 Compression Attack
JPEG2000 is another kind of compression algorithm which uses wavelet
instead of the DCT. JPEG 2000 Compressor 1.0 [2], was used for the purpose
of this test. Diﬀerent quality factors were applied to the watermarked image
lena. Table 6 summarises the results.
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Compression
(%) (M)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
10 0.015541 0.94
50 0.024503 0.79
80 0.024283 0.63
90 0.023991 0.53
Table 6: Watermark survival results after JPEG compression
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It can be clearly seen that the ASCII text watermark has not survived
any level of JPEG 2000 compression. However the watermark image FL is
still perceivable at 90% of data lost in the image (or 10% JPEG 2000 quality
factor). A plotted NMSE and correlation coeﬃcient values are illustrated in
Figure 23.
Figure 23: NMSE and Correlation values of watermark at various JPEG 2000
quality factors
The correlation graph in Figure 23 conﬁrms that even after applying a
compression ratio of 90%, the watermark image is still clearly identiﬁable.
This demonstrates the proposed algorithm is resistant to JPEG 2000 com-
pression.
7.4.3 Noise Addition Attack
Noise has been added to the watermarked image lena at varying degrees,
100% meaning all pixels were modiﬁed, 50% meaning half of the number of
pixels were modiﬁed and so on. The results are illustrated in Table 7.
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Attack
level (%)
(M)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
100 0.00032 0.86
50 0.0087 0.94
33 0.0117 0.95
25 0.01278 0.96
Table 7: Watermark survival results after noise addition
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The ASCII text watermark does not survive the noise addition at 100%
(all pixels modiﬁed), but the watermark image extracted is clearly identiﬁable
at this level of noise addition. This is conﬁrmed by a correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.86. In all other cases, both watermarks survive noise addition attacks.
Figure 24: NMSE and Correlation values of watermark at various noise ad-
dition levels
7.4.4 Resizing Attacks
To perform this attack, the watermarked image lena is ﬁrst down-sized
by a percentage and then up-sized to the original image size, loosing infor-
mation in the process. Table 8 shows the results. Attacks are measured by
the percentage of original image size reduction. For example a value of 90
(90% of the original image) means the attack reduces the image size by 10%.
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% of
original
image (M)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
90 0.024304 0.88
50 0.024494 0.79
20 0.024514 0.68
10 0.024526 0.46
Table 8: Watermark survival results after resizing attacks
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Table 8 clearly shows that the ASCII text watermark does not survive
any resizing levels. However, the watermark image FL is still recognisable
after resizing at 20% of the original image size. At this level however, the
image has clearly lost its commercial value.
Figure 25: NMSE and Correlation values of watermark at various image
resizing levels
7.4.5 Rotation Attacks
Rotation clockwise or anti-clockwise, by a very small amount (0.1 de-
gree), is usually enough to disturb the entire bit map, to such an extent that
the embedded information might be lost, but the image commercial value re-
mains. Rotation attacks (between +1.1 and -1 degree) have been performed
and the results are summarised in Table 9.
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Angle
(degree)
(M)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
0 0.024512 0.63
1 0.024095 0.08
1.1 0.023955 0.03
-0.5 0.024327 0.27
-1 0.023932 0.12
Table 9: Watermark survival results after rotation
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Between -1 and 1 degree rotation, the ASCII text watermark survives
the attack. Outside of this range of attacks, it becomes unreadable. The
extracted watermark image is however not very distinct after any attack.
Therefore it can be concluded that the proposed watermarking scheme is
moderately resistant to rotation attacks. Clockwise rotations and anti clock-
wise rotations of more than one degree do not allow recovery of either of the
two watermarks.
Figure 26: NMSE and Correlation values of watermark at various image
rotations
7.4.6 Filtering and Histogram Attacks
All these attacks were performed using Macromedia Fireworks.
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Attacks
(F)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
Brightness
contrast
0.0049176 0.88
HSL 0.019349 0.75
Gaussian
blur 1
0.024438 0.58
Gaussian
blur 2
0.024519 0.37
Table 10: Watermark survival results after attacks using Fireworks
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Brightness and contrast were increased slightly (by a value of 1) so that
the commercial quality of the image remained. From the results in Table 10,
it can be seen that both watermarks have survived the attack.
The combined Hue Saturation and Lightness (HSL) attack (increase by
a factor of 1 for each) shows that only the watermark image survives.
The Gaussian blur ﬁlter attack also demonstrates that only the watermark
image survives.
Attacks (F) NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
Histogram 0.012551 0.37
Sharpening 0.015023 0.80
Table 11: Watermark survival results after attacks using Fireworks (contin-
ued)
The Histogram attack destroys the ASCII text watermark and the wa-
termark image is barely identiﬁable.
The Sharpening attack also destroys the ASCII watermark. However the
watermark image is well preserved.
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7.4.7 Median Filter and Self Similarity Attacks
These two attacks are grouped here because they are ﬁlter attacks both
performed using Stirmark. The self similarity test is performed on RGB,
YUV, HSV or LAB colour space. A mask is deﬁned to select which channel
to attack. In this case, s for spatial was chosen when deﬁning the test.
Attacks
(S)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
Median
Filter
0 0
Self
similarity
0 0
Table 12: Watermark survival results after Stirmark attacks
As can be seen in Table 12, the watermark image is completely destroyed
after both attacks. However the ASCII text watermark is preserved 100%
in the case of the self similarity attack. This might be explained by the
fact that this test is performed on RGB, YUV, HSV or LAB but not on
YCbCr. The ASCII watermark is only preserved at 72%, in the case of
the median ﬁlter attack. Therefore, it can be conclusively deduced that the
proposed algorithm is resistant to Stirmark self similarity test. It is resistant
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to Stirmark median ﬁlter attack but to a lesser degree.
7.4.8 Cropping Attacks
Macromedia Fireworks (F) was used to conduct these attacks. For each
cropping phase, the image centre is preserved and only a percentage of the
outer part of the image is removed. In doing so, the visually signiﬁcant
part of the image is assumed to be located towards the centre of the image.
Cropping at 10% means 90% of the watermarked image remains. It is worth
mentioning that the pixels of both the watermarked image and the image
were realigned (synchronised) after attack.
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Attack
level (%)
(F)
NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
10 0.00913 0.94
25 0.00813 0.74
50 0.0068 0.65
Table 13: Watermark survival results after cropping attacks
As conﬁrmed in Appendix E (Figure 38), there is a strong linear correla-
tion between the level of cropping and the amount of watermark extracted.
This is explained by the fact that the watermark FL is spread evenly across
the image, increasing its chance of survival.
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7.4.9 Collage Attacks
The Letterkenny Institute of Technology logo was borrowed from their web-
site (www.lyit.ie), with their agreement. It was applied on diﬀerent areas of
the watermarked lena image. The LYIT logo suited this experiment well
because of its strong colour contrast with the lena image. Also because of
its width, nearly equivalent to the original image width, the impact of the
collage on the original watermark (if any) should not go un-noticed.
Region (F) NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
bottom 0.01482 0.93
center 0.01486 0.89
top 0.01478 0.94
Table 14: Watermark survival results after collage attacks
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Results in Table 14 clearly show that the LYIT logo overwrites the RGB
pixel values that it covers. It also partially replaces 3 characters (ght with
uUT) of the ASCII watermark, when applied in the area of the image where
embedding occured (collage top). Based on these results, it is reasonable to
assume that the proposed watermarking scheme will resist collage attacks
unless most of the original image is covered, in which case, its original com-
mercial value would be lost.
7.4.10 Clipping Attacks
Region (F) NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
top 0.011551 0.92
bottom 0.011874 0.94
Table 15: Watermark survival results after clipping attacks
Results in Table 15 demonstrate that clipping any area of the image will
remove any watermark bits present. However, because the watermark image
FL is spread across the entire image, it is very likely to survive clipping
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attacks, unless a very large portion of the original image is clipped, in which
case, its original commercial value would be lost.
7.4.11 Remarks
In most cases, either the ASCII text watermark or the watermark image FL
survives after attack. In the case of Stirmark tests and rotation attacks, it
is mainly the ASCII watermark that is recovered, while only the watermark
image FL survives the JPEG and JPEG2000 compression attacks and most
ﬁlter attacks. In the case of noise addition, both watermarks are recovered,
with the exception of the 100% noise addition which destroys the ASCII
watermark. These results emphasise the need for such an hybrid algorithm.
Test results conducted after geometrical attacks in particular demonstrate
the importance to synchronise pixels of original images with pixels of images
obtained after attacks. A slight mis-alignment would destroy the watermark
image FL.
Finally, looking at all graph results in Appendix E, it can be observed
that the coeﬃcient R is a much more useful marker of watermark image
ﬁdelity, before and after attack, than the NMSE. Although the NMSE is
widely used in the literature, signiﬁcant variations of its values have been
noticed, depending on the type of attack performed. This demonstrates, in
this particular study, that the NMSE may not be such a useful metric.
7.5 Security Analysis
During this testing, after watermark extraction, a visible pattern on the
watermark image itself has been noticed, as seen in Figure 27. This pattern
is characterised by the presence of light blue squares and light yellow squares
in the upper half of the image. This pattern is a direct result of the algorithm
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applied when embedding the ASCII watermark in the YCbCr.
Figure 27: Visible pattern on the extracted watermark image
Although it is only visible when extracting the watermark image FL,
it was necessary to ﬁnd out if the tested embedded technique was easily de-
tectable using steganography techniques. To do so, StegDetect and StegSe-
cret have been used.
With each steganalysis tool, each original images was tested ﬁrst to set a
proper benchmark. Each image was then tested after the watermarks were
embedded. A sensitivity of 5 for StegDetect was chosen, which is the mid-
range sensitivity level. The results are listed in Table 16 and Table 17.
Image Name Original Watermarked
lena jphide(**) jphide(**)
crown jphide(**) jphide(**)
girl jphide(**) negative
plane jphide(**) jphide(***)
boat skipped (false positive) skipped (false positive)
peppers jphide(*) skipped (false positive)
baboon skipped (false positive) skipped (false positive)
Table 16: StegDetect detection results
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It is interesting to note that at a sensitivity level of 5, most of the original
images, which are not supposed to contain any hidden information, report
a positive detection to the jphide method. This raises questions regarding
the accuracy of StegDetect. However, apart from the image plane, which
shows an increased detection probability that the jphide algorithm is used,
results between the original image and the watermarked image are similar
for the other images. These results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm
is not detected accurately by StegDetect.
Image Name Original Watermarked
lena no detection no detection
crown no detection no detection
girl no detection no detection
plane no detection no detection
boat Hiderman program detected! Hiderman program detected!
peppers no detection no detection
baboon Hiderman program detected! Hiderman program detected!
Table 17: StegSecret detection results
Similarly to the previous experiment, the original images boat and ba-
boon show a positive detection of the Hiderman program. Unfortunatly,
no useful information could be found on Hiderman's algorithm, apart from
the fact that it is used to protect privacy by hidding information in many
diﬀerent ﬁle formats. The result when running the boat original and wa-
termarked image displays a message saying Steganography found at marker
position 15547. The result when running the baboon original and water-
marked image displays a message saying Steganography found at marker
position 178438. This also raises questions regarding the detection accuracy
of StegSecret. Overall, StegSecret has not managed to detect the proposed
watermarking scheme.
Finally, the Stirmark PSNR test was used to measure the strength of
the proposed watermarking method. If after performing this test, the two
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watermarks can be extracted and they are positively identiﬁable, the strength
of this watermarking technique will be proven. Using Stirmark, starting from
0, each step is incremented by 10 until 100 is reached. Table 18 shows only
the signiﬁcant steps.
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PSNR test NMSE R Extracted Watermarks
10 0 0.64
20 0 0.10
50 0 0
90 0 0
Table 18: Watermarking strength
Using Stirmark as a benchmark to measure the strength of the proposed
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algorithm, it can be concluded that only the ASCII text watermark is identi-
ﬁable throughout each step, showing the strength of the proposed embedding
technique in the YCbCr. However the technique used to embed in the RGB
is weak, judging by Stirmark standards, as the watermark image is not re-
coverable from step 20 upwards.
7.6 Capacity Analysis
Capacity is more a concern of steganographers rather than those implement-
ing watermarking techniques. As such, it is not essential to embed a lengthy
watermark in order to uniquely identify an image to its author. For example,
a unique social security number associated to a country identiﬁer and a time
stamp or an image name is all that is required to provide uniqueness.
The proposed embedding technique uses two watermarks:
1. An ASCII text which is short: 20 characters in total, each character is
8 bit, therefore 160 bits long.
2. An watermark image: 50 by 50 pixels, each pixel is converted to 8 bit
before embedding, therefore 20000 bits long.
Due to the algorithm used to embed in the YCbCr, limits are placed on the
ASCII watermark length that can be used. If applied to an image of size 512
by 512 pixels and a block of size 19 by 19 pixels, the maximum number of
watermark text characters to embed would be 84. Using smaller block size
would increase watermark capacity but to the detriment of robustness, as it
was observed during experimentation.
Overall the proposed algorithm provides for a reasonable size watermark,
which can be a simple logo combined with a short ASCII text of up to 20
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characters long, or two pieces of text of 2500 characters and 20 characters
respectively.
7.7 Complexity Analysis
Algorithm complexity refers to processing power required to embed and
extract the watermark. This is an important factor that any commercial
entity would take into consideration, particularly if the volume of images to
protect is signiﬁcant. In order to evaluate the cpu time in seconds (computer
resource) that the proposed algorithm is using, the time it takes to embed and
extract the watermarks for each image has been computed, on a computer
running a dual core 2GHz processor and 4 gigabytes of memory on a 32 bits
Operating System running Windows 7. Results are available in Table 19 and
graphed in Figure 28.
Images Embedding time (s) Extraction time (s)
lena 0.33 0.42
crown 0.37 0.36
girl 0.37 0.41
plane 0.31 0.36
boat 0.33 0.34
peppers 0.34 0.34
baboon 0.36 0.36
Table 19: CPU time used to embed and extract the watermarks
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Figure 28: embedding and extraction time
Regardless of the image used, the time it takes to embed is approximately
equal to the time it takes to extract the two watermarks, which is around
0.3 to 0.4 seconds. This is signiﬁcantly faster (four times faster) than the 1.2
seconds it took to embed in the frequency domain using the afore mentioned
DWT method.
7.8 Conclusion
As observed during the tests, measuring the robustness of a watermark
is a diﬃcult task to achieve: the range of distortion is almost inﬁnite and
diﬃcult to model or deﬁne [83]. Having said that, a wide range of attacks
have been measured, giving a very comprehensive idea on how well the pro-
posed algorithm can withstand these attacks. Due to the hybrid technique
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proposed, the proposed watermarking algorithm can resist a wide range of
attacks, with the exception of a useful but limited resistance to rotation and
histogram attacks (see Table 21 in Appendix E). In general, it was observed
that when one watermark was destroyed, the other remained intact, so in a
sense they are complementary. However it is very diﬃcult to predict what
an attacker will do and how well this algorithm can resist a combination of
attacks, as the variety of such possible attacks is large.
In light of the experimentation results, this hybrid algorithm does not
impair the image quality, is fairly secure and is very eﬃcient in terms of
processing power required to implement.
During the tests, no improvement (nor deterioration) in robustness was
observed, by embedding ﬁrst in the RGB rather than the YCbCr colour
space. This suggests that embedding in the RGB and the YCbCr does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect one over the other.
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8 CONCLUSION - RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 Overall Conclusion
The aim of this research was to propose a watermarking algorithm, inspired
by steganography techniques, to hide the watermark so that it is undetectable
and this makes the watermark harder to remove or destroy. It was also
to demonstrate an improvement in terms of robustness, over the current
methods used.
Results in Chapter 7 show that not only the watermarking technique
proposed is undetectable to visual inspection, but that the steganalysis tools
used, failed to detect it also. This demonstrates that the hybrid algorithm is
unnoticed, even when two separate watermarks are used (with one of them
containing a signiﬁcant number of bytes to hide).
Experiments conducted show that the hybrid watermarking method pre-
sented can withstand levels of geometric and processing attacks, up to a
point where the commercial value of the images tested would be lost. In
fact, no other studies sourced, have demonstrated robustness to such a large
array of attacks. It is also interesting to note that despite the current trend,
which favors frequency domain embedding (DWT in particular) over spatial
domain embedding, it has been demonstrated that the use of spatial domain
techniques can perform very well in terms of robustness, while being more
eﬃcient in terms of processing.
On the security aspect, the proposed hybrid algorithm was benchmarked
against Stirmark, showing good resilience of the ASCII watermark to the
PSNR test, at all levels of attacks. In other words, the stringent Stirmark
test removed the watermark image FL, but the ASCII watermark remained.
Finally, no research experiments that were conducted on all the char-
acteristics of a successful watermarking scheme were found, i.e. invisibil-
ity, robustness, security, capacity and complexity. Most of the publications
sourced, focus on invisibility and robustness only. In order to increase the
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commercial viability of any watermarking scheme, the processing power re-
quired should remain as low as possible, in situations where the number of
images to protect is large. This characteristic has been clearly demonstrated
in this document.
8.2 Recommendations for future work
Resistance to cropping, clipping and rotation in particular could be further
improved by embedding the ASCII watermark towards the center of the
image rather than starting from the top left. Pixels displacement is minimised
at the center of an image rather than at its extremity, after image rotation.
Furthermore, the experimental results obtained show that, in most cases,
only one of the two watermarks survives. One could therefore suggest that
combining rotation with JPEG compression for example, might remove the
two watermarks. It would be interesting to investigate alternative hybrid
watermarking in the YCbCr colour space, combining spatial and frequency
domain embedding, to see if this would improve robustness, in particular
to geometric attacks such as rotation. The use of histogram embedding
techniques in the YCbCr, would be an interesting focus point for further
research.
Another issue raised with the proposed algorithm lies in the fact that it is
semi-blind. Although one does not need the original image in order to extract
the ASCII watermark, one needs it to extract the watermark image FL. It
is therefore imperative to securely store the original image for the proposed
scheme to be successful. This adds complexity to the management of this
watermaking model. Further research in this area is necessary in order to
make this watermarking scheme completely blind. The use of a private key
to determine the exact embedding and extraction location of the watermark
might be of beneﬁt. Perhaps the private key could even be used as the ASCII
text watermark in the YCbCr.
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Appendix A
Algorithm Description Advantages Problems
Fourier
Melin
Transform
Use spread spectrum
technique for
watermark
generation,
embedding and
detection
RST Invariance Diﬃcult to
implement
Phase Cor-
relation
and Log
Polar
Mapping
Watermark is
embedded into the
LPM domain
RST Invariance,
moderate
resistance to
scaling and
compression
Diﬃculty in
embedding the
message caused
by the LPM and
inverse LPM.
Original image
is needed.
Phase only
ﬁltering
and Log
Polar
Mapping
Rotation and scaling
induce a shift in LPM
domain. A ﬁlter is
used to compute the
possible shift, to
reestablish the
original image shape
size and position.
very robust to
RS, good JPEG
compression
resistance and
noise addition.
Original image
is needed to
deduce the
template.
One di-
mensional
Projection
and LPM
Based on FM
Transform with some
properties of the one
dimensional
projection.
Good RS and
compression and
noise addition
resistance
It is a
multiplicative
method rather
than an additive
method, so the
optimal
coeﬃcients need
to be found.
Table 20: Comparison of RST (rotation, scaling and translation) Invariant
Image Watermarking Algorithms[88]
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Algorithm Description Advantages Problems
Radon
Transform
Retrieve geometrical
transformations in
order to resynchronise
the image to its
original form
good resistance
to RS, JPEG
compression and
noise addition
Inaccuracy of
the transformed
coeﬃcient
retrieval
corrected by
extra
computation
Template Templates are located
in the middle
frequency spectrum
good resistance
to RS. Average
JPEG
compression
resistance. Poor
noise addition
resistance
Problematic
accuracy
detection of the
watermark.
Salient
Feature
Local image feature
detection used to
extract robust feature
points.
Good RS and
JPEG
compression and
noise addition
resistance.
Limited
embedding
capacity.
Mediocre
performance due
to algorithm
complexity.
Image
decompo-
sition
Watermark is
embedded into the
untransformed
domain while location
parameters
embedding is
determined by FM
transform
Good resistance
to RS, JPEG
compression and
noise addition
more susceptible
to geometric
distortions.
Stochastic
Analysis
Bispectrum feature
vector is used to
embed the watermark
Invariant to
translation and
scaling.
poor resistance
to cropping.
Table 21: Comparison of RST (rotation, scaling and translation) Invariant
Image Watermarking Algorithms[88] (continued)
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Appendix B
Colour is no longer interpreted as an extension of grey scale. It is consid-
ered as a key element for a number of image processing systems. In particular,
colour space transforms have played a central role in coding, compression
and transmission applications. Colour also plays a major role in pattern
recognition and digital multimedia, where colour-based features and colour
segmentations have been proved eﬀective in indexing and retrieving image
content. The aim of this chapter is to explore in more details how to use
colour spaces for the beneﬁt of watermarking.
Colour in the context of the HVS
To understand precisely the concept of colour information, it is worth
reviewing the fundamental properties of the HVS [24]. Colour is deﬁned as
an experience in human perception. In physics terms, a colour is the result
of an observed light on the retina of the eye. The human eye sees colour
by means of cones in the retina. There are three types of cones sensitive
to wavelengths that approximately correspond to red, green and blue lights.
Together with information from rod cells (which are not sensitive to colour)
the cone information is encoded and sent to higher brain centres along the
optic nerve. A human eye can recognise colours in the range of 400 nanome-
tres (violet) to 700 nanometres (red) and can adapt to a large variation of
illumination levels (see Figure 29).
129
Figure 29: Human Visual Spectrum [33]
The vision system perceives this range of light wavelengths as a smoothly
varying rainbow of colours, which is called the visual spectrum. One of the
biggest problems in colour image processing is to ﬁnd the appropriate colour
space for the problem being addressed. While the application context often
deﬁnes the original space (such as RGB for computer images or YCbCr for
television video) the insertion space has to be discussed according to the
expected properties of the watermark.
Colour Spaces
In this section, the characteristics of human visual perception to the dif-
ference between colours in diﬀerent colour spaces are discussed.
A colour space is a method by which one can specify, create and visualise
colour. Humans deﬁne a colour by its attributes of brightness, hue and
colourfulness. A computer deﬁnes a colour in terms of the excitations of red,
green and blue phosphors on the CRT faceplate. A printing press deﬁnes a
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colour in terms of the reﬂectance and absorbance of cyan, magenta, yellow
and black inks on the paper.
Imagining that each of the three attributes used to describe a colour are
axes in a three dimensional space then this deﬁnes a colour space. So, a
colour space is a mathematical representation of human perception.
Since the HVS has a limited sensitivity in perceiving visual information,
it is well believed that there exists quite an amount of perceptual redundancy
in colour images. The perceptual redundancy of a particular colour is rep-
resented by the perceptually indistinguishable colour region in which each
colour cannot be distinguishable; that is, the perceptual colour diﬀerence in
the perceptually indistinguishable colour region is close to zero. Through
making the embedded watermarks part of the perceptual redundancy in
colour images, watermark insertion can be achieved with transparency.
The perceptual redundancy inherent in colour images of diﬀerent colour
spaces is estimated based on the numerical colour diﬀerence in the uniform
colour space. The extent of the perceptual redundancy of a colour varies
with the colour space where it is represented. With the varying volume
of perceptually indistinguishable colour region in diﬀerent colour spaces, a
watermarking scheme based on the perceptual redundancy is implemented
and the corresponding results of robustness of the watermarking scheme are
compared.
The three most popular colour models are RGB (used mostly in computer
graphics), YIQ, YUV or YCbCr (used in video systems) and CMYK (used
in colour printing). But other colour models are presented for completion.
Mathematical formulae presented in the following sections were taken from
[8].
The RGB and YCbCr colour spaces were developed in Chapter 5. In the
following sections you will ﬁnd other colour spaces for completeness.
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CMY(K) Colour Space
The CMY colour model is used in colour printing and refers to the three
inks used (secondary colours of light): cyan, magenta, yellow. On printer
devices, a component of black is added to the CMY, and the second colour
space is then called CMYK. The black component is actually used because
cyan, magenta, and yellow set up to the maximum should produce a black
colour. It is said to be subtractive because inks subtract brightness from
white. The conversion from RGB to CMY is performed using the simple
operation:
C = 1 - R
M = 1 - G
Y = 1 - B
This equation shows that light reﬂected from a surface containing pure
cyan does not reﬂect red, pure magenta does not reﬂect green and pure yellow
does not reﬂect blue.
The conversion from CMY back to RGB can also be obtained simply
by substracting the individual CMY values from 1. In practice, this later
conversion is of little interest, once the ink is on the paper, unless the paper
is scanned to be digitized.
HSI, HSL, HSV and related colour spaces
The representation of the colours in the RGB and CMY(K) colour spaces
are designed for speciﬁc devices. But for a human observer, they are not
useful deﬁnitions. For user interfaces a more intuitive colour space, designed
for the way one actually thinks about colour is preferred. Such a colour space
is HSI: Hue, Saturation and Intensity, which can be thought of as a RGB
cube tipped up onto one corner (see Figure 30).
The line from RGB=min to RGB=max becomes vertical and is the inten-
sity axis (I ). The position of a point on the circumference of a circle around
this axis is the hue (H ) and the saturation (S ) is the radius from the central
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Figure 30: HSI Colour Space [34]
intensity axis to the colour.
The transforms are given below:
Hue = (α-arctan((Red-intensity)*(3^0.5)/(Green-Blue)))/(2*PI)
with:
α = pi/2 if Green > Blue
α = 3*pi/2 if Green < Blue
Hue = 1 if Green = Blue
Saturation = (Red^2 + Green^2 + Blue^2 - Red*Green - Red*Blue -
Blue*Green)^0.5
Intensity = (Red + Green + Blue)/3
Note that Intensity must be computed before Hue. If not, it must be as-
sumed that Hue = (α-arctan((2*Red-Green-Blue)/((Green-Blue)*(3^0.5))))/(2*pi).
H, S, L, R, G, and B are within the range of 0 to 1.
Actually, there are many variations on HSI, e.g. HSL, HSV, HCI (chroma
/ colourfulness), HVC, TSD (hue saturation and darkness). But they all do
basically the same thing. The major disadvantage of these models are the
conversion complexity which is mainly because the hue is expressed as an
angle.
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CIE XYZ Colour Space
The CIE has deﬁned a human "Standard Observer", based on measure-
ments of the colour-matching abilities of the average human eye. Their rec-
ommendations are as follow:
 Brightness: The attribute of a visual sensation according to which an
area appears to exhibit more or less light.
 Hue: The attribute of a visual sensation according to which an area
appears to be similar to one, or to proportions of two, of the perceived
colours red, yellow, green and blue.
 Colourfulness: The attribute of a visual sensation according to which
an area appears to exhibit more or less of its hue. One can go from a
sky blue to a deep blue by changing this attribute.
Using data from measurements made in 1931, a system of three primaries,
XYZ, was developed in which all visible colours can be represented using
only positive values of X, Y and Z. The Y primary is identical to Luminance,
X and Z give colouring information. This forms the basis of the CIE 1931
XYZ colour space, which is fundamental to all colourimetry. Values are
normally assumed to lie in the range 0 to 1. Colours are rarely speciﬁed in
XYZ terms, it is far more common to use chromaticity coordinates, which
are independent of the Luminance (Y). The main advantage of CIE XYZ,
and any colour space or colour deﬁnition based on it, is that it is completely
device independent. The main disadvantage with CIE-based spaces is the
complexity of implementing them, in addition some are not user intuitive.
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CIE Luv and CIE Lab
In 1976, the CIE deﬁned two new colour spaces to get more uniform and
accurate models. The ﬁrst of these two colour spaces is the CIE Luv whose
components are L*, u* and v*. L* component deﬁnes the luminance, and
u*, v* deﬁne chrominancy. CIE Luv is mostly used in calculation of small
colours or colour diﬀerences, especially with additive colours. The CIE Luv
colour space is deﬁned from CIE XYZ.
The second, CIE Lab is proposed as a new incorporated colour space in
TIFF speciﬁcations, where three components are used: L* is the luminance,
a* and b* are respectively red/blue and yellow/blue chrominancies. This
colour space is also deﬁned with regard to the CIE XYZ colour spaces where,
L = 116 . ((Y/Yn)^(1/3)) - 16 if Y/Yn > 0.008856
L = 903.3 . Y/Yn if Y/Yn <= 0.008856
a = 500 . (f(X/Xn) - f (Y/Yn))
b = 200 . (f(Y/Yn) - f(Z/Zn))
where
f(t) = t^(1/3) with Y/Yn > 0.008856
f(t) = 7.787 . t+16/116 with Y/Yn <= 0.008856
LCH and CIE LSH
CIELab and CIELuv both have a disadvantage if applied to user inter-
faces, they are unintuitive to use. To solve this the CIE deﬁnitions can be
used for chroma (c), Hue angle (h) and saturation (s). Hue, chroma and sat-
uration can be derived from CIELuv, and Hue and chroma - but not satura-
tion - can be derived from CIELab (this is because CIELab has no associated
chromaticity diagram and so no correlation of saturation is possible).
To distinguish between LCH derived from CIELuv and CIELab the values
of Hue, H, and Chroma, C, are given the subscripts uv if from CIELuv and
ab if from CIELab.
For example LCH derived from CIElab is computed as follows:
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L = L*
C = (a*2+ b*2)0.5
H = 0 if a = 0
H = (arctan((b*)/(a*))+kpi/2)/(2pi) if a <> 0
and
(k = 0 if a* >= 0 and b* >= 0) or (k = 1 if a* > 0 and b* < 0) or (k =
2 if a* < 0 and b* < 0) or (k = 3 if a* < 0 and b* > 0)
LCH derived from CIELuv is computed as follows:
L = L*
C = (u*2 + v*2)0.5 or C = Ls
H = arctan[(v*)/(u*)]
H=0 if u=0
H=(arctan((v*)/(u*))+kpi/2) / (2pi) if u <> 0
and
(k = 0 if u* >= 0 and v* >= 0) or (k = 1 if u* > 0 and v* < 0) or (k
= 2 if u* < 0 and v* < 0) or (k = 3 if u* < 0 and v* > 0)
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Appendix C
DWT Code implementation using MATLAB, developed as part of the origi-
nal investigation.
DWT Embedding
% start of code used to evaluate DWT watermarking
clear all;clc;
% save start time
start_time=cputime;
% read in lena image
file_name='lena_grey.bmp';
cover_object=double(imread(file_name));
% determine size of watermarked image
Mc=size(cover_object,1);
Nc=size(cover_object,2);
% read in the watermark image and reshape it into a vector
file_name='copyright.bmp';
message=double(imread(file_name));
Mm=size(message,1);
Nm=size(message,2);
message_vector=round(reshape(message,Mm*Nm,1)./256);
[cA1,cH1,cV1,cD1] = dwt2(cover_object,'haar');
k=15; %gain factor
% add pn sequences to H1 and V1 componants when watermark pixel is black
for kk=1:length(message_vector)
if (message(kk) == 0)
if(cH1(kk) >= 0)
cH1(kk)=cH1(kk)+k;
end
if(cV1(kk) >= 0)
cV1(kk)=cV1(kk)+k;
end
end
end
% perform IDWT
watermarked_image = idwt2(cA1,cH1,cV1,cD1,'haar',[Mc,Nc]);
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% convert back to uint8
watermarked_image_uint8=uint8(watermarked_image);
% write watermarked Image to file
imwrite(watermarked_image_uint8,'dwt_watermarked.bmp','bmp');
% display processing time
elapsed_time=cputime-start_time;
disp(elapsed_time)
% calculate the PSNR
psnr=psnr(cover_object,watermarked_image_uint8);
disp(psnr)
% display watermarked image
figure(1) imshow(watermarked_image_uint8,[]) title('Watermarked Image')
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DWT Extraction
% start of code used to evaluate DWT watermarking
clear all;clc;
% save start time
start_time=cputime;
% read in the watermarked
file_name='dwt_watermarked.bmp';
watermarked_image=double(imread(file_name));
% code used for JPEG compression
%compression = 90;
%file_compressed = sprintf('compression_%d_percent.jpg', compression);
%imwrite( imread(file_name), file_compressed, 'Quality', compression);
%watermarked_image=double(imread(file_compressed));
% end of compression code
% determine size of watermarked image
Mw=size(watermarked_image,1);
Nw=size(watermarked_image,2);
% read in original watermark to get size
file_name='copyright.bmp';
orig_watermark=double(imread(file_name));
% determine size of original watermark
Mo=size(orig_watermark,1);
No=size(orig_watermark,2);
% initalize message to all ones
message_vector=ones(1,Mo*No);
[cA1,cH1,cV1,cD1] = dwt2(watermarked_image,'haar');
k=15; %gain factor
for kk=1:length(message_vector)
if(cH1(kk) - k >= 0)
message_vector(kk)=0;
end
if(cV1(kk)- k >= 0)
message_vector(kk)=0;
end
end
% reshape the message vector and display recovered watermark.
figure(2)
message=reshape(message_vector,Mo,No);
imshow(message,[])
title('Recovered Watermark')
% display processing time
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elapsed_time=cputime-start_time;
disp(elapsed_time)
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Appendix D
Hybrid Watermarking code implementation using MATLAB.
Graphical User Interface (GUI)
Figure 31: MATLAB GUI
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GUI Code
function varargout = mainform(varargin)
% MAINFORM M-file for mainform.fig is our GUI entry point
% MAINFORM, by itself, creates a new MAINFORM or raises the existing
% singleton*.
%
% H = MAINFORM returns the handle to a new MAINFORM or the handle to
% the existing singleton*.
%
% MAINFORM('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) calls the local
% function named CALLBACK in MAINFORM.M with the given input arguments.
%
% MAINFORM('Property','Value',...) creates a new MAINFORM or raises the
% existing singleton*. Starting from the left, property value pairs are
% applied to the GUI before mainform_OpeningFcn gets called. An
% unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property application
% stop. All inputs are passed to mainform_OpeningFcn via varargin.
%
% OUTPUT:
% GUI enabling us to insert / extract watermarks and test against
% attacks
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
% Begin initialization code
gui_Singleton = 1;
gui_State = struct('gui_Name', mfilename, ...
'gui_Singleton', gui_Singleton, ...
'gui_OpeningFcn', @mainform_OpeningFcn, ...
'gui_OutputFcn', @mainform_OutputFcn, ...
'gui_LayoutFcn', [] , ...
'gui_Callback', []);
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1})
gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1});
end
if nargout
[varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:});
else
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gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:});
end
% End initialization code
% --- Executes just before mainform is made visible.
function mainform_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, varargin)
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn.
% hObject handle to figure
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
% varargin command line arguments to mainform (see VARARGIN)
% Choose default command line output for mainform
handles.output = hObject;
% Update handles structure
guidata(hObject, handles);
% Prepare space for image display
axes(handles.pic_original); axis off;
axes(handles.pic_combined); axis off;
axes(handles.pic_watermark); axis off;
axes(handles.pic_attacked); axis off;
axes(handles.pic_w_extracted); axis off;
% Clear main Matlab windows
clc;
% Clear all variables
clear all;
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line.
function varargout = mainform_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% varargout cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT);
% hObject handle to figure
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
% Get default command line output from handles structure
varargout{1} = handles.output;
% --- Executes on button press in btnLoadHostImg.
function btnLoadHostImg_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
global original_image;
% hObject handle to btnLoadHostImg (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
%
% Invoke file selection window
[filename,pathname]=uigetfile({'*.tiff';'*.jpg'},'Original Image');
% Load original image
original_image = imread(filename);
image(original_image,'parent',handles.pic_original);
axes(handles.pic_original); axis off;
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% Make button and text area active
set(handles.txtCoder,'Enable','on');
set(handles.btnEncode,'Enable','on');
% Display filename under image
set(handles.lblOutputImage,'String',filename);
% clear decoded string box and also text to encode
set(handles.txtCoder, 'String', );
set(handles.txtDecoder, 'String', );
% --- Executes on button press in btnLoadWatermark.
function btnLoadWatermark_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
global watermark_image;
% hObject handle to btnLoadWatermark (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
%
global watermark;
% Invoke file selection window
[filename,pathname]=uigetfile({'*.jpg'},'Watermark');
% Load watermark image
watermark_image = imread(filename);
watermark = watermark_image;
image(watermark_image,'parent',handles.pic_watermark);
axes(handles.pic_watermark); axis off;
% Display filename under image
set(handles.lblWatermark,'String',filename);
function txtCoder_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to txtCoder (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of txtCoder as text
% str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of txtCoder
% as a double
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties.
function txtCoder_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to txtCoder (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns
% called
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows.
% See ISPC and COMPUTER.
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), ...
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white');
end
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% --- Executes on button press in btnEncode.
function btnEncode_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
global watermark_image original_image combined_image;
global original_image_y_size original_image_x_size;
% hObject handle to btnEncode (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
start_time = cputime;
original_watermark_image = watermark_image;
image_temporary = original_image; % that's the original image
% read the input from the text box
ascii_codes = unicode2native(get(handles.txtCoder,'String'), 'ISO-8859-1');
% FIRST PART: the image watermark embedding
image_temporary = insertWatermark(image_temporary, original_watermark_image);
% SECOND PART: hide the ascii text into the YCbCr colour space of image
% encodeInYCbCr is built-in function
image_temporary = encodeInYCbCr(ascii_codes, image_temporary);
% display time taken to embed
end_time = cputime - start_time;
disp(['embedding time: ' num2str(end_time)])
image_output = image_temporary;
% Save result in bmp file
imwrite(image_output,'watermarked_img.bmp','bmp'); set(handles.lblCombined,...
'String','watermarked_img.bmp');
% Load watermarked image: combinasion of both original + watermark
combined_image = image_output;
image(combined_image,'parent',handles.pic_combined);
axes(handles.pic_combined); axis off;
% Display filename under image
decibels = PSNR(original_image, combined_image);
% Compute SSIM
ssim_val = SSIM(original_image, combined_image);
set(handles.lblPSNR,'String',sprintf('PSNR = %5.2f dbs - SSIM = %4.4f', ...
decibels,ssim_val));
% enable the decode button
set(handles.btnDecode,'Enable','on');
% --- Executes on button press in btnDecode.
function btnDecode_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to btnDecode (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
global combined_image original_image watermark;
image_temporary = combined_image; % this is the original + watermark
start_time = cputime;
% Display decoded text in text area
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% decodeInYCbCr is built-in function
decoded_text = decodeInYCbCr(image_temporary);
set(handles.txtDecoder, 'String', char(native2unicode(decoded_text, 'ISO-8859-1')));
% extract the watermark image
extracted_watermark = extractWatermark(combined_image, original_image);
% display time taken to embed
end_time = cputime - start_time;
disp(['extraction time: ' num2str(end_time)])
image(extracted_watermark,'parent',handles.pic_w_extracted);
axes(handles.pic_w_extracted); axis off;
% compute differences between original watermark image and
% extracted watermark image
gf = wSimilarity(watermark, extracted_watermark, 'all', 'v');
function txtDecoder_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to txtDecoder (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties.
function txtDecoder_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to txtDecoder (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns called
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'),...
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white');
end
% --- Executes on button press in btnAbout.
function btnAbout_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to btnAbout (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
helpdlg({'Spatial & YCbCr Hybrid Watermarking',...
'- LSB embedding by weighted addition in spatial domain',...
'- LSB embedding in YCbCr components',,...
'Fred Lusson,','LYIT','Letterkenny, Ireland',,'2011'});
% --- Executes on button press in btnLoadAttackedImg.
function btnLoadAttackedImg_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to btnLoadAttackedImg (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
global combined_image original_image;
% Invoke file selection window
[filename,pathname]=uigetfile({'*.bmp';'*.jpg'},'Fred Lusson');
% Load image
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combined_image = imread(filename);
image(combined_image,'parent',handles.pic_attacked);
axes(handles.pic_attacked); axis off;
% Display filename under image
set(handles.lblAttacked,'String',filename);
set(handles.txtDecoder,'String',);
%reset image display to empty
reset(handles.pic_w_extracted); hold off;
axes(handles.pic_w_extracted); axis off;
% enable the decode button
set(handles.btnDecode,'Enable','on');
% --- Executes on button press in btnRunAttacks.
function btnRunAttacks_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
% hObject handle to btnRunAttacks (see GCBO)
% eventdata reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB
% handles structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA)
global combined_image original_image_y_size original_image_x_size;
% BEGINNING of tests against robustness
runTests(combined_image, original_image_y_size, original_image_x_size);
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Function to insert the watermark image FL
function [combined_image] = insertWatermark(original_image, ...
original_watermark_image)
% insertWatermark Inserts the image watermark into the original RGB
% image
%
% USAGE:
% [combined_image] = insertWatermark(original_image,
% original_watermark_image)
%
% INPUT:
% original_watermark_image: original watermark image.
% original_image: original image to watermark.
%
% OUTPUT:
% combined_image: watermark + original image combined
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% *******************************************************************
global original_image_x_size original_image_y_size ...
original_watermark_y_size original_watermark_x_size;
% the percent used to multiply the watermark bit values by before
% adding them to original_image.jpg
% 1.0 = 100
WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE = 0.01;
% grab the x and y resolution for original image
original_image_x_size = size( original_image, 2 );
original_image_y_size = size( original_image, 1 );
original_watermark_x_size = size(original_watermark_image,2);
original_watermark_y_size = size(original_watermark_image,1);
% resize watermark image to be the same same as the original host image
resized_watermark_image = imresize(original_watermark_image,...
[original_image_y_size, original_image_x_size]);
% create a blank image the same size as the original host image
% this will store the new image that is a combination of the original host image
% and watermark
combined_image = zeros(original_image_y_size, original_image_x_size,3);
% add the original host image and the watermark but only give the pixels in
% the resized watermark a weighted value determined by
% WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE
for x_value = 1:original_image_x_size
for y_value = 1:original_image_y_size
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combined_image(y_value,x_value,1) = original_image(y_value,x_value,1)...
+ (resized_watermark_image(y_value,x_value,1) * WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE);
combined_image(y_value,x_value,2) = original_image(y_value,x_value, 2)...
+ (resized_watermark_image(y_value,x_value,2) * WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE);
combined_image(y_value,x_value,3) = original_image(y_value,x_value,3)...
+ (resized_watermark_image(y_value,x_value,3) * WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE);
end
end
% force the combined image colour values to be between 0 and 255
combined_image = uint8( combined_image );
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Function to extract the watermark image FL
function [watermark_restored_image]=extractWatermark(combined_image,original_image)
% extractWatermark Extracts the image watermark embedded in RGB combined_image
%
% USAGE:
% [watermark_restored_image] = extractWatermark(combined_image,
% original_image)
%
% INPUT:
% combined_image: original image combined with the watermark.
% original_image: original image to watermark.
%
% OUTPUT:
% watermark_restored_image: the watermark image scaled to its original
% dimentions
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
global original_image_x_size original_image_y_size original_watermark_y_size ...
original_watermark_x_size;
WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE = 0.01;
% check needed to extract the embedded watermark by comparing the original
if isempty(original_image)
[filename1,pathname] = uigetfile('*.*','select the original image');
original_image = imread(num2str(filename1));
end
% create a blank image the same size as the original host image
watermark_restored_big_image = zeros( original_image_y_size, ...
original_image_x_size,3);
combined_image = imresize( combined_image, [original_image_y_size, ...
original_image_x_size] );
% take the values in the combined image and subtract them from the original
% host image values, this will give the values that were added to
% the original host image above, then divide these values by
% WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE in order to try
% to get the original values in the original watermark
for x_value = 1:original_image_x_size
for y_value = 1:original_image_y_size
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watermark_restored_big_image( y_value, x_value, 1 ) = ...
( combined_image( y_value, x_value, 1 ) - ...
original_image( y_value, x_value, 1 ) ) / WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE;
watermark_restored_big_image( y_value, x_value, 2 ) = ...
( combined_image( y_value, x_value, 2 ) - ...
original_image( y_value, x_value, 2 ) ) / WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE;
watermark_restored_big_image( y_value, x_value, 3 ) = ...
( combined_image( y_value, x_value, 3 ) - ...
original_image( y_value, x_value, 3 ) ) / WEIGHTED_COMBINE_VALUE;
end
end
% force watermark restored image colour values to be between 0 and 255
watermark_restored_big_image = uint8( watermark_restored_big_image );
% resize watermark_restored_big_image to the size of the original
% watermark
watermark_restored_image = imresize( watermark_restored_big_image, ...
[ original_watermark_y_size , original_watermark_x_size ] );
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Function to embed the ASCII Watermark in the YCbCr
colour space
function [image_output] = encodeInYCbCr(ascii_codes, image_temporary)
% encodeInYCbCr converts the ASCII watermark to binary and embedded in
% image_temporary
%
% USAGE:
% [image_output] = encodeInYCbCr(ascii_codes, image_temporary)
%
% INPUT:
% image_temporary: image matrix or vector.
% ascii_codes: text watermark.
%
% OUTPUT:
% image_output: the original image combined with the watermark
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
BLOCK_SIZE = x;
% Generate watermark bits from text area
WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE = 32 * 8;
% has to be a multiple of 8
watermark = zeros(1, WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE);
for l=1:size(ascii_codes,2)
code_string=num2str(dec2bin(ascii_codes(l),8));
for m=1:8
code_string(m);
watermark(m+((l-1)*8))=eval(code_string(m));
end
end
% Conversion RGB -> YCbCr
image_temporary_ycbcr = rgb2ycbcr(image_temporary);
% Extract Y, Cb, Cr components
y = image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,1);
cb = image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,2);
cr = image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,3);
% Create LSB matrix for Cb and Cr components
% For 2-bit coding use mod(component,4)
lsbits_cb = mod(cb,2);
lsbits_cr = mod(cr,2);
152
% --WATERMARK EMBEDDING ALGORITHM--
bit_position = 1;
% we need this to adjust automatically to the selected image, where width
% and height may vary
[w_size,k_size,p] = size(image_temporary);
for w=1:(w_size / BLOCK_SIZE)
for k=1:(k_size / BLOCK_SIZE)
% define our array position (start/end) at each pass
w_s = ((w - 1) * BLOCK_SIZE) + 1; %width_start
w_e = w * BLOCK_SIZE; %width_end
h_s = ((k - 1) * BLOCK_SIZE) + 1; % height_start
h_e = k * BLOCK_SIZE; % height_end
% Embed watermark bits in blocks BLOCK_SIZE x BLOCK_SIZE only
if(mod((w + k), 2) == 0)
% just a check to ensure we do not go over the max watermark
% length
if(bit_position < WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE)
if(watermark(bit_position) == 1)
% If current watermark bit is 1, then LSB of Cb is 0 and LSB
% of Cr is 1
% For 2-bit coding we can use cr()=cr()+3;
cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e);
cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e)+1;
else
% If current watermark bit is 0, then LSB of Cb is 1
% and LSB of Cr is 0
cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e);
cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e)+1;
end
else
continue
end
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else
% Opposite scheme in adjacents blocks
% just a check to ensure we do not go over the max watermark
% length
if(bit_position < WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE)
if(watermark(bit_position)==1)
cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e);
cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e)+1;
else
cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cb(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e);
cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) = cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e) - ...
lsbits_cr(w_s:w_e, h_s:h_e)+1;
end
else
continue
end
end
bit_position = bit_position + 1;
end
end
% Create result image
image_temporary_ycbcr(:, :, 1) = y;
image_temporary_ycbcr(:, :, 2) = cb;
image_temporary_ycbcr(:, :, 3) = cr;
% Conversion YCbCr -> RGB
image_output = ycbcr2rgb(image_temporary_ycbcr);
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Function to extract the ASCII watermark
function [decoded_txt] = decodeInYCbCr(image_temporary)
% decodeInYCbCr Computes the ASCII watermark embedded in image_temporary
%
% USAGE:
% [decoded_txt] = decodeInYCbCr(image_temporary)
%
% INPUT:
% image_temporary: image matrix or vector.
%
% OUTPUT:
% decoded_txt: the watermark ASCII string
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
BLOCK_SIZE = x;
% Define starting watermark payload as zero bits
WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE = 32 * 8;
watermark = zeros(1,WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE);
% Conversion RGB -> YCbCr
image_temporary_ycbcr = rgb2ycbcr(image_temporary);
% Extract Y, Cb, Cr components
y=image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,1);
cb=image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,2);
cr=image_temporary_ycbcr(:,:,3);
% Create LSB martix for Cb and Cr components
lsbits_cb = mod(cb,2);
lsbits_cr = mod(cr,2);
% --WATERMARK EXTRACTION ALGORITHM--
bit_position=1;
% Counters used for deciding watermark value in block
counter0=0;
counter1=0;
% we need this to adjust automatically to the selected image, where width
% and height may vary
[w_size,k_size,p] = size(image_temporary);
for block_w=1:(w_size / BLOCK_SIZE)
for block_k=1:(k_size / BLOCK_SIZE)
% Read image in blocks
if mod((block_w + block_k), 2) == 0
for w = ((block_w-1) * BLOCK_SIZE) + 1:block_w * BLOCK_SIZE
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for k=((block_k-1)*BLOCK_SIZE)+1:block_k*BLOCK_SIZE
if lsbits_cb(w,k) < 1
% For 2-bit coding use lsbits_cb()<2
counter1=counter1+1;
else
counter0=counter0+1;
end
if lsbits_cr(w,k) >= 1
counter1=counter1+1;
else
counter0=counter0+1;
end
end
end
else
for w=((block_w-1)*BLOCK_SIZE)+1:block_w*BLOCK_SIZE
for k=((block_k-1)*BLOCK_SIZE)+1:block_k*BLOCK_SIZE
if lsbits_cb(w,k)>=1
counter1=counter1+1;
else
counter0=counter0+1;
end
if lsbits_cr(w,k)<1
counter1=counter1+1;
else
counter0=counter0+1;
end
end
end
end
% Decision of watermark bit value in current block
if counter0 > counter1
watermark(bit_position)=0;
else
watermark(bit_position)=1;
end
% Move to next position in watermark
bit_position=bit_position+1;
% Reset counters
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counter0 = 0;
counter1 = 0;
end
end
% Conversion of binary form of watermark to text displayed in text area
read_bit = 1;
for read_byte=1:(WATERMARK_MAX_SIZE/8)
ascii_code=0;
for read_bit=1:8
bit_decimal_value = watermark(read_bit+((read_byte-1)*8))*...
2^(abs((read_bit-1)-7));
ascii_code = ascii_code + bit_decimal_value;
end
decoded_txt(read_byte) = ascii_code;
end
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Function to compute the PSNR
function decibels = PSNR(x, y)
% PSNR - compute the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio, defined by :
% PSNR(x,y) = 10*log10( max(max(x),max(y))^2 / |x-y|^2 ).
%
% INPUT:
% x is the original image
% y is the combined image: original + watermarks
%
% OUTPUT:
% decibels: above 38dbs is considered invisible
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
x = double(x); % image width
y = double(y); % image length
% identical images
if(x == y)
decibels = 100;
% find difference between images
else
d = mean( mean( (x(:)-y(:)).^2 ) );
m1 = max( abs(x(:)) );
m2 = max( abs(y(:)) );
m = max(m1,m2);
decibels = 10*log10( m^2/d );
end
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Function to compute the SSIM
function [mssim, ssim_map] = ssim(img1, img2, K, window, L)
%
% This is an implementation of the algorithm for calculating the
% Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) index between two images
%
% Referrence:
%
% Z. Wang, A. C. Bovik, H. R. Sheikh, and E. P. Simoncelli, "Image
% quality assessment: From error visibility to structural similarity,
% IEEE Transactios on Image Processing, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 600-612,
% Apr. 2004.
%
%
% INPUT :
% (1) img1: the first image being compared
% (2) img2: the second image being compared
% (3) K: constants in the SSIM index formula (see the above
% reference). defualt value: K = [0.01 0.03]
% (4) window: local window for statistics (see the above
% reference). default widnow is Gaussian given by
% window = fspecial('gaussian', 11, 1.5);
% (5) L: dynamic range of the images. default: L = 255
%
% OUTPUT:
% (1) mssim: the mean SSIM index value between 2 images.
% If one of the images being compared is regarded as
% perfect quality, then mssim can be considered as the
% quality measure of the other image.
% If img1 = img2, then mssim = 1.
% (2) ssim_map: the SSIM index map of the test image. The map
% has a smaller size than the input images. The actual size
% depends on the window size and the downsampling factor.
%
% USAGE:
% Given 2 test images img1 and img2, whose dynamic range is 0-255
%
% [mssim, ssim_map] = ssim(img1, img2);
%
% ***********************************************************************
% check arguments
if (nargin < 2 || nargin > 5)
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
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return;
end
if (size(img1) ~= size(img2))
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
[M N] = size(img1);
if (nargin == 2)
if ((M < 11) || (N < 11))
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return
end
window = fspecial('gaussian', 11, 1.5);
K(1) = 0.01;
K(2) = 0.03;
L = 255;
end
if (nargin == 3)
if ((M < 11) || (N < 11))
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
window = fspecial('gaussian', 11, 1.5);
L = 255;
if (length(K) == 2)
if (K(1) < 0 || K(2) < 0)
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end;
else
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
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end
if (nargin == 4)
[H W] = size(window);
if ((H*W) < 4 || (H > M) || (W > N))
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
L = 255;
if (length(K) == 2)
if (K(1) < 0 || K(2) < 0)
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
else
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
end
if (nargin == 5)
[H W] = size(window);
if ((H*W) < 4 || (H > M) || (W > N))
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
if (length(K) == 2)
if (K(1) < 0 || K(2) < 0)
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
end
else
mssim = -Inf;
ssim_map = -Inf;
return;
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end
end
img1 = double(img1);
img2 = double(img2);
% automatic downsampling
f = max(1,round(min(M,N)/256));
%downsampling by f
%use a simple low-pass filter
if(f>1)
lpf = ones(f,f);
lpf = lpf/sum(lpf(:));
img1 = imfilter(img1,lpf,'symmetric','same');
img2 = imfilter(img2,lpf,'symmetric','same');
img1 = img1(1:f:end,1:f:end);
img2 = img2(1:f:end,1:f:end);
end
C1 = (K(1)*L)^2;
C2 = (K(2)*L)^2;
window = window/sum(sum(window));
mu1 = filter2(window, img1, 'valid');
mu2 = filter2(window, img2, 'valid');
mu1_sq = mu1.*mu1;
mu2_sq = mu2.*mu2;
mu1_mu2 = mu1.*mu2;
sigma1_sq = filter2(window, img1.*img1, 'valid') - mu1_sq;
sigma2_sq = filter2(window, img2.*img2, 'valid') - mu2_sq;
sigma12 = filter2(window, img1.*img2, 'valid') - mu1_mu2;
if (C1 > 0 && C2 > 0)
ssim_map = ((2*mu1_mu2 + C1).*(2*sigma12 + C2))./...
((mu1_sq + mu2_sq + C1).*(sigma1_sq + sigma2_sq + C2));
else
numerator1 = 2*mu1_mu2 + C1;
numerator2 = 2*sigma12 + C2;
denominator1 = mu1_sq + mu2_sq + C1;
denominator2 = sigma1_sq + sigma2_sq + C2;
ssim_map = ones(size(mu1));
index = (denominator1.*denominator2 > 0);
ssim_map(index) = (numerator1(index).*numerator2(index))./...
(denominator1(index).*denominator2(index));
index = (denominator1 ~= 0) & (denominator2 == 0);
ssim_map(index) = numerator1(index)./denominator1(index);
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end
mssim = mean2(ssim_map);
return;
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Function to generate attacks
function runTests(image_output, output_y_size, output_x_size)
% runTests runs image attack on the combine image
%
% USAGE:
% runTests(image_output, output_y_size, output_x_size)
%
% INPUT:
% image_output: the image to test.
% output_y_size: y axis size of image to test.
% output_x_size: x axis size of image to test.
%
% OUTPUT:
% all images that have gone through some processing
%
% DESCRIPTION:
% List of image attacks:
% - scaling: from original size to 10 x 10px (each iteration
% subtracts 10px from previous size
% - compression: from 5% to 95%
% - rotation: every 0.1 degree between -0.3 to +0.3
% - noise addition:
% 0 means every pixel contains added noise
% 1 means ~50% of pixels contain added noise,
% 2 means ~33%, % 3 means ~25%
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
% image output is the combined image: original image + image watermark +
% text
% RESIZING the percent to resize the combined image 10%
for i=output_y_size: -50: 50
resized_image = imresize( image_output, [i, i] );
imwrite(resized_image, sprintf('attacks/resize_%d.bmp', i),'bmp');
end
% COMPRESSION
imwrite(image_output,sprintf('attacks/compression_100_percent.jpg',100),...
'Quality', 100); PERCENT_OF_COMPRESSION = 50;
for i=5: 10:100
imwrite(image_output,sprintf('attacks/compression_%d_percent.jpg',i),...
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'Quality', i);
end
% ROTATION
for i=-5: 0.1: 5
image_rotated = imrotate( image_output, i );
imwrite(image_rotated,sprintf('attacks/rotation_%0.1f.bmp',i),'bmp');
end
% NOISE ADDITION
% specifies the maximum noise value
MAX_NOISE_VALUE = 20;
% specifies the approximate amount of noise
% 0 means every pixel of the combined image will have added noise
% 1 means ~50% will have added noise, 2 means ~33%, 3 means ~25%, ....
for i=0:3
noise_image = uint8( zeros( output_y_size, output_x_size, 3 ) );
% create a random noise image
for x_value = 1:output_x_size
for y_value = 1:output_y_size
if round( rand() * i) == 0
noise_image( y_value, x_value, 1 ) = round( rand() *...
(MAX_NOISE_VALUE + 1) );
noise_image( y_value, x_value, 2 ) = round( rand() *...
(MAX_NOISE_VALUE + 1) );
noise_image( y_value, x_value, 3 ) = round( rand() *...
(MAX_NOISE_VALUE + 1) );
end
end
end
% add the noise image to the combined image
noise_combined_image = image_output + noise_image;
imwrite(noise_combined_image,sprintf('attacks/noise_%d.bmp',i),'bmp');
end
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Function to compute NMSE and R
function [gf] = wSimilarity(t, y, fMeasure, options)
% wSimilarity computes similarity measures between the original watermark
% and the extracted watermark after attacks
%
% USAGE:
% [gf] = wSimilarity(t,y)
% [gf] = wSimilarity(t,y,fMeasure)
% [gf] = wSimilarity(t,y,fMeasure,options)
%
% INPUT:
% t: matrix or vector of target values for regression model
% y: matrix or vector of output from regression model.
% fMeasure: a string or cell array of string values representing
% different form of goodness of fit measure as follows:
%
% 'all' - calculates all the measures below
% '1' - normalised mean squared error (nmse)
% '2' - coefficient of correlation (r)
%
% options: a string containing other output options, currently the only
% option is verbose output.
%
% 'v' - verbose output, posts some text output for the
% chosen measures to the command line
%
% OUTPUT:
% gf: vector of goodness of fit values between model output and target
% for each of the strings in fMeasure
%
% EXAMPLES
%
% gf = wSimilarity(t,y); for all statistics in list returned as vector
%
% gf = wSimilarity(t,y,'all','v'); for all statistics in list returned
% as vector with information posted to
% the command line on each statistic
%
% AUTHOR:
% Frederic Lusson
%
% ***********************************************************************
error(nargchk(2,4,nargin));
% reshape matrices into vectors (order of data is not important)
t = reshape(t,1,[]);
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y = reshape(y,1,[]);
if length(t) ~= length(y)
error('Invalid data size: size of t and y must be same')
end
if nargin > 2
% check if fMeasure is cell string array or just a string
if ~iscell(fMeasure) && ischar(fMeasure)
if strcmp(fMeasure,'all')
% if the string 'all' is passed in, all the stats are
% required so make the appropriate cell string array
fMeasure = {'1' '2'};
% return all measures
else
% otherwise convert string to cell string array of size 1
fMeasure = {fMeasure};
end
else
% if it is a cell array of strings, check its size
if size(fMeasure,2) == 1
% if there is only one element check it is not a request
% for all measures
if strcmp(char(fMeasure),'all')
% if the string 'all' is passed in, all the stats are
% required so make the appropriate cell string array
fMeasure = {'1' '2'};
% return all measures
end
end
end
else
% return all measures if only two inputs, nothing will be posted to
% the command line
fMeasure = {'1' '2'};
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end
% remove NaNs from the arrays, avoid modifying them if there are no
% NaNs to prevent reallocation of memory
if sum(isnan(t) | isnan(y))
inds = ~isnan(t) | ~isnan(y);
t = t(inds);
y = y(inds);
end
e = t - y; % Calculate the error
gf = ones(1,size(fMeasure,2)); % preallocate array
for i = 1:size(fMeasure,2)
switch char(fMeasure(i))
case '1' % normalised mean squared error
gf(i) = mean(e.^2)/var(double(t));
if nargin == 4
if options == 'v'
disp(['normalised mean squared error (nmse): ...'
num2str(gf(i))])
end
end
case '2' % coefficient of correlation
cf = corr2(t,y); % 1 - perfect match
gf(i) = cf;
if nargin == 4
if options == 'v'
disp(['coefficient of correlation (r): ' num2str(gf(7))])
end
end
otherwise
error('Invalid measure in fMeasure(%d):...
\nIt must be one of the strings {1 2}, ...
but actually contained %s',i,char(fMeasure(i)))
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end
end
return;
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Appendix E
Attacks Watermark FL ASCII Watermark
JPEG compression yes no
JPEG 2000 compression yes no
Noise Addition yes no
Resizing yes no
Rotation no yes (limit -1, +1 degree)
Cropping yes yes (limited)
Clipping yes yes (limited)
Collage yes yes
Brightness contrast yes yes
Gaussian Blur yes no
Hue Saturation Lightness yes no
Histogram no no
Sharpening yes no
Median Filter no yes (90%)
Self Similarity no yes
Stirmark Strength Test no yes
Table 22: Watermark survival to attacks
Images lena crown girl
Level (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
100 0.0003 0.86 0 0.0003 0.84 0 0.0077 0.09 0
50 0.0087 0.94 100 0.0088 0.94 100 0.0139 0.38 100
33 0.0117 0.94 100 0.0118 0.94 100 0.0159 0.50 100
25 0.0128 0.94 100 0.0129 0.94 100 0.0167 0.54 100
Table 23: Results after noise addition attacks
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Images plane boat peppers baboon
Level (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
100 0.0003 0.90 0 0.0003 0.90 0 0.0002 0.90 0 0.0003 0.88 0
50 0.0088 0.94 100 0.0088 0.94 100 0.0088 0.94 100 0.0089 0.94 100
33 0.0119 0.94 100 0.0119 0.94 100 0.0118 0.94 100 0.0119 0.94 100
25 0.0129 0.94 100 0.0130 0.94 100 0.0130 0.94 100 0.0130 0.94 100
Table 24: Results after noise addition attacks (continued)
Figure 32: Test images comparison - noise addition attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Level (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
5 0.0220 0.09 0 0.0213 0.09 0 0.0224 0.07 0
15 0.0241 0.30 0 0.0232 0.29 0 0.0243 0.18 0
25 0.0244 0.44 0 0.0239 0.44 0 0.0244 0.22 0
35 0.0244 0.52 0 0.0243 0.52 0 0.024 0.25 0
45 0.0244 0.59 0 0.0243 0.57 0 0.0245 0.26 0
55 0.0245 0.64 0 0.0244 0.66 0 0.0245 0.27 0
65 0.0245 0.68 0 0.024 0.68 0 0.0245 0.28 0
75 0.0245 0.73 0 0.0245 0.75 0 0.0245 0.30 0
85 0.0245 0.79 0 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0245 0.32 0
95 0.0245 0.84 0 0.0245 0.86 0 0.0245 0.36 0
Table 25: Results after JPEG compression attacks
Images plane boat peppers baboon
Level (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
5 0.0218 0.11 0 0.0225 0.13 0 0.0227 0.11 0 0.0244 0.16 0
15 0.0222 0.30 0 0.0240 0.29 0 0.0243 0.29 0 0.0245 0.27 0
25 0.0232 0.38 0 0.0243 0.39 0 0.0245 0.41 0 0.0245 0.37 0
35 0.0238 0.55 0 0.0245 0.49 0 0.0245 0.50 0 0.0245 0.44 0
45 0.0239 0.59 0 0.0245 0.55 0 0.0245 0.56 0 0.0245 0.52 0
55 0.0240 0.63 0 0.0245 0.57 0 0.0245 0.61 0 0.0245 0.57 0
65 0.0234 0.64 0 0.0245 0.61 0 0.0245 0.65 0 0.0245 0.61 0
75 0.0240 0.71 0 0.0245 0.64 0 0.0245 0.71 0 0.0245 0.66 0
85 0.0239 0.75 0 0.0245 0.69 0 0.0245 0.77 0 0.0245 0.71 0
95 0.0240 0.82 0 0.0245 0.75 0 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0245 0.73 0
Table 26: Results after JPEG compression attacks (continued)
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Figure 33: Test images comparison - JPEG compression attacks
Images lena crown girl
Level (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%)
10 0.0240 0.53 0 0.0236 0.64 0 0.0242 0.25 0
20 0.0243 0.63 0 0.0241 0.76 0 0.0243 0.29 0
30 0.0244 0.74 0 0.0242 0.79 0 0.0244 0.32 0
40 0.0245 0.76 0 0.0242 0.82 0 0.0245 0.34 0
50 0.0245 0.79 0 0.0243 0.86 0 0.0245 0.37 0
60 0.0245 0.80 0 0.0243 0.87 0 0.0245 0.38 0
70 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0243 0.88 0 0.0245 0.39 0
80 0.0245 0.87 0 0.0243 0.88 0 0.0245 0.40 0
90 0.0155 0.94 0 0.0151 0.94 0 0.0181 0.60 0
Table 27: Results after JPEG2000 compression attacks
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Images plane boat peppers baboon
Level (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
10 0.0222 0.53 0 0.0236 0.39 0 0.0244 0.50 0 0.02 0.26 0
20 0.0227 0.51 0 0.0241 0.50 0 0.0245 0.60 0 0.02 0.38 0
30 0.0232 0.65 0 0.0243 0.55 0 0.0245 0.68 0 0.02 0.44 0
40 0.0235 0.73 0 0.0243 0.57 0 0.0245 0.71 0 0.02 0.50 0
50 0.0236 0.78 0 0.0243 0.59 0 0.0245 0.74 0 0.02 0.55 0
60 0.0238 0.84 0 0.0244 0.63 0 0.0245 0.76 0 0.02 0.61 0
70 0.0240 0.87 0 0.0244 0.68 0 0.0245 0.77 0 0.02 0.65 0
80 0.0240 0.88 0 0.0244 0.72 0 0.0245 0.79 0 0.02 0.66 0
90 0.0151 0.94 0 0.0157 0.94 0 0.0155 0.94 0 0.0155 0.94 0
Table 28: Results after JPEG2000 compression attacks (continued)
Figure 34: Test images comparison - JPEG2000 compression attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Size (pixel) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
62x62 0.0244 0.46 0 0.0243 0.54 0 0.0245 0.22 0
112x112 0.0245 0.68 0 0.0243 0.72 0 0.0245 0.29 0
162x162 0.0245 0.75 0 0.0242 0.80 0 0.0245 0.32 0
212x212 0.0245 0.77 0 0.0239 0.83 0 0.0245 0.34 0
262x262 0.0245 0.79 0 0.0237 0.85 0 0.0224 0.36 0
312x312 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0235 0.87 0 0.0245 0.38 0
362x362 0.0244 0.83 0 0.0233 0.88 0 0.0245 0.40 0
412x412 0.0244 0.86 0 0.0231 0.90 0 0.0244 0.43 0
462x462 0.0243 0.88 0 0.0227 0.92 0 0.0245 0.46 0
Table 29: Results after image resizing attacks
Images plane boat peppers baboon
Size (pixel) nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
62x62 0.0242 0.40 0 0.0245 0.33 0 0.0245 0.41 0 0.0245 0.24 0
112x112 0.0242 0.60 0 0.0245 0.57 0 0.0245 0.68 0 0.0245 0.41 0
162x162 0.0241 0.68 0 0.0245 0.65 0 0.0245 0.74 0 0.0245 0.49 0
212x212 0.0240 0.73 0 0.0244 0.68 0 0.0245 0.76 0 0.0245 0.53 0
262x262 0.0239 0.77 0 0.0244 0.71 0 0.0245 0.78 0 0.0245 0.56 0
312x312 0.0238 0.80 0 0.0244 0.73 0 0.0245 0.79 0 0.0245 0.59 0
362x362 0.0236 0.83 0 0.0244 0.75 0 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0245 0.62 0
412x412 0.0233 0.86 0 0.0244 0.78 0 0.0245 0.83 0 0.0245 0.65 0
462x462 0.0228 0.89 0 0.0244 0.82 0 0.0244 0.83 0 0.0245 0.70 0
Table 30: Results after image resizing attacks (continued)
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Figure 35: Test images comparison - resizing attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Angle
(de-
gree)
nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%)
-1 0.0239 0.17 0 0.0234 0.36 90 0.0242 0.16 20
-0.9 0.0240 0.17 0 0.0234 0.36 90 0.0242 0.15 20
-0.8 0.0240 0.17 0 0.0234 0.36 90 0.0242 0.15 50
-0.7 0.0241 0.17 0 0.0234 0.36 90 0.0243 0.16 50
-0.6 0.0242 0.18 0 0.0235 0.36 90 0.0243 15 70
-0.5 0.0243 0.27 0 0.0240 0.48 100 0.0244 0.20 100
-0.4 0.0244 0.28 0 0.0237 0.48 100 0.0244 0.21 100
-0.3 0.0244 0.29 0 0.0237 0.48 100 0.0244 0.21 100
-0.2 0.0244 0.30 0 0.0238 0.48 100 0.0245 0.21 100
-0.1 0.0245 0.58 0 0.0238 0.48 100 0.0245 0.31 100
0 0.0243 0.63 0 0.0151 0.94 100 0.0181 0.6 100
0.1 0.0245 0.56 0 0.0239 0.69 100 0.0245 0.31 100
0.2 0.0244 0.26 0 0.0239 0.47 100 0.0244 0.20 100
0.3 0.0244 0.24 0 0.0238 0.46 100 0.0244 0.20 100
0.4 0.0243 0.23 0 0.0239 0.46 100 0.0244 0.19 100
0.5 0.0243 0.22 0 0.0239 0.45 100 0.0244 0.19 100
0.6 0.0242 0.12 0 0.0235 0.34 100 0.0243 0.14 100
0.7 0.0242 0.11 0 0.0235 0.33 100 0.0242 0.13 100
0.8 0.0241 0.10 0 0.0236 0.32 100 0.0242 0.13 100
0.9 0.0241 0.09 0 0.0235 0.32 100 0.0242 0.12 100
1.0 0.0240 0.08 0 0.0236 0.31 100 0.0242 0.12 100
1.1 0.0240 0.03 0 0.0235 0.24 20 0.0240 0.09 20
Table 31: Results after rotation attacks
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Images plane boat peppers baboon
Angle
(de-
gree)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
-1 0.0241 0.27 60 0.0244 0.19 70 0.0235 0.20 70 0.0245 0.10 70
-0.9 0.0242 0.29 70 0.0244 0.20 70 0.0235 0.21 70 0.0245 0.11 70
-0.8 0.0242 0.30 70 0.0244 0.20 70 0.0236 0.21 70 0.0245 0.11 70
-0.7 0.0242 0.31 80 0.0244 0.21 80 0.0236 0.22 80 0.0245 0.12 80
-0.6 0.0243 0.32 80 0.0244 0.21 80 0.0236 0.22 80 0.0245 0.12 80
-0.5 0.0244 0.45 100 0.0245 0.32 100 0.0241 0.33 100 0.0245 0.22 100
-0.4 0.0244 0.47 100 0.0245 0.34 100 0.0242 0.34 100 0.0245 0.23 100
-0.3 0.0244 0.48 100 0.0245 0.35 100 0.0242 0.35 100 0.0245 0.24 100
-0.2 0.0245 0.50 100 0.0245 0.36 100 0.0242 0.36 100 0.0245 0.24 100
-0.1 0.0244 0.68 100 0.0245 0.57 100 0.0244 0.57 100 0.0245 0.43 100
0 0.0151 0.94 100 0.0153 0.94 100 0.0152 0.794 100 0.0153 0.94 100
0.1 0.0242 0.69 100 0.0245 0.53 100 0.0244 0.57 100 0.0245 0.42 100
0.2 0.0245 0.49 100 0.0245 0.33 100 0.0241 0.35 100 0.0245 0.23 100
0.3 0.0245 0.49 100 0.0245 0.33 100 0.0241 0.33 100 0.0245 0.22 100
0.4 0.0245 0.49 100 0.0245 0.31 100 0.0241 0.32 100 0.0245 0.20 100
0.5 0.0245 0.48 100 0.0245 0.30 100 0.0240 0.30 100 0.0245 0.20 100
0.6 0.0244 0.35 100 0.0244 0.19 100 0.0236 0.21 100 0.0245 0.10 100
0.7 0.0244 0.35 100 0.0244 0.18 100 0.0235 0.20 100 0.0245 0.10 100
0.8 0.0243 0.33 100 0.0244 0.17 100 0.0235 0.19 100 0.0245 0.09 100
0.9 0.0243 0.32 100 0.0244 0.17 100 0.0235 0.19 90 0.0245 0.08 90
1.0 0.0243 0.32 100 0.0244 0.16 100 0.0234 0.18 90 0.0245 0.08 90
1.1 0.0242 0.24 20 0.0243 0.09 10 0.0231 0.13 10 0.0245 0.04 10
Table 32: Results after rotation attacks (continued)
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Figure 36: Test images comparison - rotation attacks
Images lena crown girl
Attacks nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%)
brightness
contrast 1
0.0049 0.88 100 0.0059 0.85 100 0.0181 0.60 100
brightness
contrast 5
0.0025 0.38 0 0.0020 0.47 0 0.0094 0.14 0
hue saturation
lightness 1
0.0193 0.75 0 0.0159 0.82 0 0.0244 0.58 0
gaussian blur 1 0.0244 0.78 0 0.0245 0.85 0 0.0245 0.37 0
gaussian blur 2 0.0245 0.59 0 0.0245 0.73 0 0.0225 0.29 0
histogram 0.0126 0.37 0 0.0201 0.08 0 0.0201 0.16 0
sharpen 0.0150 0.80 0 0.0245 0.86 0 0.0181 0.60 0
Table 33: Results after ﬁlters and histogram attacks
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Images plane boat peppers baboon
Attacks nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
brightness
contrast 1
0.0058 0.94 100 0.0065 0.86 100 0.0072 0.88 0 0.0062 0.88 100
brightness
contrast 5
0.0030 0.42 70 0.0059 0.50 0 0.0058 0.43 0 0.0033 0.46 20
hue
saturation
lightness 1
0.0235 0.87 100 0.0209 0.86 100 0.0170 0.83 0 0.0202 0.85 90
gaussian
blur 1
0.0245 0.73 0 0.0245 0.68 0 0.0245 0.75 0 0.0245 0.54 0
gaussian
blur 2
0.0245 0.56 0 0.0245 0.50 0 0.0245 0.55 0 0.0245 0.37 0
histogram 0.0111 0.27 0 0.0140 0.25 0 0.0153 0.32 0 0.0206 0.26 0
sharpen 0.0245 0.79 0 0.0245 0.72 0 0.0245 0.81 0 0.0245 0.58 0
Table 34: Results after ﬁlters and histogram attacks (continued)
Figure 37: Test images comparison - ﬁltering, histogram attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Level (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
10 0.0091 0.94 100 0.0092 0.95 100 0.0101 0.93 100
25 0.0081 0.74 0 0.0082 0.77 0 0.0111 0.72 0
50 0.0068 0.45 0 0.0072 0.49 0 0.0082 0.42 0
Table 35: Results after cropping attacks
Images plane boat peppers baboon
Level
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
10 0.0091 0.92 100 0.0091 0.94 100 0.0081 0.94 100 0.0127 0.92 100
25 0.0081 0.84 0 0.0081 0.79 0 0.0082 0.72 0 0.0164 0.68 0
50 0.0068 0.44 0 0.0068 0.46 0 0.0067 0.41 0 0.0143 0.40 0
Table 36: Results after cropping attacks (continued)
Figure 38: Test images comparison - cropping attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Region nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii
(%)
bottom 0.0148 0.93 100 0.0148 0.94 100 0.0121 0.91 100
center 0.0149 0.89 100 0.0150 0.89 100 0.0113 0.87 100
top 0.0148 0.94 90 0.0159 0.95 90 0.0102 0.93 90
Table 37: Results after collage attacks
Images plane boat peppers baboon
Region nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
bottom 0.0148 0.10 100 0.0149 0.93 100 0.0140 0.91 100 0.0153 0.94 100
center 0.0149 0.89 100 0.0150 0.89 100 0.0125 0.86 100 0.0151 0.85 100
top 0.0148 0.96 90 0.0150 0.92 90 0.0140 0.91 90 0.0147 0.95 90
Table 38: Results after collage attacks (continued)
Figure 39: Test images comparison - collage attacks
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Images lena crown girl
Region nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%) nmse r ascii (%)
bottom 0.0119 0.94 100 0.0121 0.94 100 0.0109 0.92 100
top 0.0116 0.92 0 0.016 0.93 0 0.0109 0.91 0
Table 39: Results after clipping attacks
Images plane boat peppers baboon
Region nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii
(%)
nmse r ascii nmse r ascii
(%)
bottom 0.0119 0.91 100 0.0120 0.93 100 0.0132 0.91 100 0.0102 0.76 100
top 0.016 0.93 0 0.0116 0.92 0 0.0127 0.89 100 0.0100 0.73 0
Table 40: Results after clipping attacks (continued)
Figure 40: Test images comparison - clipping attacks
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